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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines corporate social responsibility’s (CSR) effect on the implied ex 
ante cost of equity capital with a S&P500 data during sample period 2002-2013. In ad-
dition, the relation between CSR and firm riskiness is analysed during the financial cri-
sis period 2007-2009. The findings indicate that CSR investments have not decreased 
companies’ financing costs, but the impact has been rather neutral. Also, companies that 
have invested in CSR have not benefit from it during financial crisis compared to com-
panies with low CSR. Furthermore, the impact of controversial business areas on the 
cost of equity capital is scrutinized. This study shows that companies involved in con-
troversial benefit from slightly lower financing costs. This result holds even during the 
financial crisis period. 
 
The findings of this study indicate that the markets do not price the CSR activities. 
Thus, companies with higher CSR involvement do not benefit from lower financing 
costs from the capital markets. The CSR literature has not been able to fully explain 
CSR’s effect on firm valuation, and therefore there is no solid evidence about how CSR 
actually impacts on valuation. However, this study claims that CSR does not have an 
impact on the cost of equity capital, and therefore companies do not profit from lower 
financing costs by investing in CSR practices. 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Tutkimus tarkastelee yritysvastuun vaikutusta ennusteiden pohjalta estimoituun oman 
pääoman hankintakustannukseen. Tutkimuksessa käytetään S&P500 dataa ja 
havaintojakso on vuosilta 2002-2013. Lisäksi yritysvastuun ja yrityksen riskisyyden 
välinen suhde on finanssikriisin 2007-2009 on huomioitu. Tutkimustulokset osoittavat, 
että investoinnit yritysvastuuseen eivät suoranaisesti laske yrityksen rahoituskuluja ja 
yritysvastuun vaikutus oman pääoman hankintakustannukseen on neutraali. Yritykset 
eivät myöskään ole hyötyneet vastuullisuudesta finanssikriisin aikana, verrattuna yri-
tyksiin, jotka eivät ole investoineet yritysvastuuseen.  
 
Tutkimus huomioi myös kiistanalaisten liiketoimien vaikutusta oman pääoman hankin-
takustannukseen. Tulosten perusteella markkinat ovat suosineet hieman enemmän yri-
tyksiä, jotka toimivat kiistanalaisilla liiketoiminnan alueilla suoden näille yrityksille 
alemman oman pääoman hankintakustannuksen. Tämä vaikutus on pitää myös fi-
nanssikriisin aikana.  
 
Tämä tutkimus osoittaa, että markkinat eivät ole hinnoitelleet yritysten investointeja 
yritysvastuuseen. Täten vastuullisemmat yritykset eivät hyödy alemmasta estimoituun 
oman pääoman hankintakustannuksen tasosta. Aikaisempi yritysvastuukirjallisuus ei ole 
kyennyt täysin selittämään, millä keinoin yritysvastuu vaikuttaa yritysten ar-
vostamiseen. Tämän vuoksi ei ole olemassa pitäviä todisteita, kuinka yritysvastuuseen 
investoinnit vaikuttavat. Tämän tutkimukset kuitenkin osoittavat, ettei yritysvastuu 
vaikuta yrityksen oman pääoman hankintakustannukseen, eivätkä vastuullisemmat yri-
tykset siten hyödy alemmista rahoituskuluista. 
 
 
 
 
 
AVAINSANAT: Yritysvastuu, Oman pääoman hankintakustannus, Sidosryhmäteoria
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Economic globalization has significantly adjusted the environment inwich corporations 
operate. Firstly, the competition has expanded as a consequence of globalization and 
therefore indefinite markets. Secondly, corporations have to response to stakeholders’ 
increased demands in value creation. Lastly, economic globalization has involved the 
corporations to enhance their corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a result of in-
creasing amount of acts that encourage corporations to strengthen their practices accord-
ing to numerous responsibility criteria (Bassen, Meyer & Schlange, 2006:4). 
 
Companies are often seen as a part of the society operating alongside with the public 
sector. Therefore, studies state that the companies are responsible of social welfare (e.g. 
Carrol, 1999; Barnett, 2007; Dahlsrud, 2008). The concept of CSR is rarely described 
unambiguously. CSR is frequently defined as a combination of good quality corporate 
governance, activity in environmental and human rights protection, and interest in na-
tional economic development (Petkoski & Twose, 2003: 2) 
 
Thus, while concentrating in value creation, companies also have to consider society’s 
demands towards corporations’ more sustainable development policies, which have in-
creased during the latest decades by the means of legislation and norms. In recent years 
various companies have made sustainability and CSR statements, and adopted these 
practices into their company policies. Companies’ increased concern in CSR and sus-
tainability issues is an interesting topic for couple of reasons. Firstly, the classical finan-
cial theory states that the most crucial function for corporations is maximizing share-
holder’s value, which traditionally, and extremely simplified, means that all investments 
should be linear with increasing shareholder’s value (e.g. by investing in profitable pro-
jects) or be profited as a dividend. And secondly, CSR and sustainability practices may 
be often seen as a value loss in a sense that the company will not create actual profits by 
investing into improvement of CSR or sustainability practices. Thus, why do companies 
invest on CSR if it is not profitable, and how is the social concerns balanced against the 
need to create value to shareholders? Due to this dilemma a question about possible 
benefits from CSR practices, and whether the markets have priced companies’ acts to 
increase their CSR is raised. In addition, a question whether applying CSR and sustain-
ability practices is only “greenwashing”, where the actual efforts made to increase envi-
ronmentally sound practices are remote, or do companies actually change their practic-
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es. Most importantly, does the adoption matter – do companies benefit from being CSR 
compliant? 
 
Researchers have not ignored the question whether companies benefit from adopting 
CSR and sustainability practices. Companies’ involvement in CSR acts has raised ques-
tions, whether there is theoretical evidence that companies that “do good” also do better 
in financially. Consequently, the highly increased CSR interests and legislation have 
developed a field of CSR and sustainability studies. However, the perspectives of these 
studies vary, and there is no absolute solution for this question.  
 
A branch of studies examines the relationship between CSR and corporate financial per-
formance (Roman, Hayibor & Agle, 1999; Lee & Faff, 2009; Lopéz, Garcia 
&Rodriguez, 2007; Jiao, 2010; Kim & Statman, 2012), while other studies investigate 
the association between CSR and risk (e.g. El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok & Mishra, 
2011; Dhaliwal, Tsan & Yang, 2011; Goss and Roberts, 2011), while some of the stud-
ies research study the association between CSR and stock price risk (e.g. Kim, Li & Li, 
2014). The results from the studies that examine impact of CSR and sustainability on 
company performance fail to show explicitly by what method company bene-
fits/disadvantages from introducing CSR practices into company policies. Also, many 
of these studies suggest that the CSR practices impact by lowering investment costs.  
 
Roman et al. (1999), Jiao (2010) and Kim & Statman (2012) find supporting evidence 
that applying CSR practices improve company’s financial performance. On the other 
hand, Lopez et al. (2007) find that adopting CSR practices actually increase the costs of 
the company and therefore decrease the company’s performance during first periods. 
Yet, Lopez et al. (2007:296) estimate positive long-term results, and thus the negative 
impact persists only short-term.  
 
In addition, the studies that examine the relationship between CSR and risk show that 
CSR and sustainability practices decrease company’s risks to be involved in sanctioned 
activity or diminish the financing risks (e.g. El Ghoul et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2014). 
The decreased risk will create long-term value for the investors, since the risk of future 
value loss will decrease. Furthermore, El Ghoul et al., 2011, Dhaliwal et al., 
2011 and Goss and Roberts, 2011 find that the companies CSR actions reduce the com-
pany’s cost of capital, which means that companies that have adopted CSR practices 
benefit from lower investment costs. Kim et al. (2014) also find that introduction of 
CSR practices is negatively affiliated with stock price crash risk.  
11 
 
 
The benefits from adopting CSR practices seem to be linked to corporations’ long-term 
profitability and positive value creation. Moreover, some of the studies (El Ghoul et al., 
2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011) show CSR practices decrease the investment risk. There-
fore, it looks that corporations have become aware that they can obtain long-term profits 
and increase shareholder’s value by fulfilling both economic and sustainability criteria. 
 
However, even though the companies have become more aware of the higher demands 
of CSR and sustainability activities, it is hypothesized that the presentation of the con-
nection between CSR and corporate financial performance depends highly on the ra-
tionale behind investors’ choices and the influence of these choices on security markets 
(Hill, Ainscough, Shank & Manullang, 2007:165). This indicates that the investor proxy 
has also an effect on whether companies profit from investing in CSR activities. E.g. 
Kim & Statman (2012:115) find that companies benefit by increasing investments in 
sustainability when the increase will be consistent with investors’ interests, and on the 
other hand, companies will decrease investments in sustainability when it lowers finan-
cial performance. Moreover, positive performance indicators such as strong corporate 
management, reputational benefits, and a forward-looking business style have been as-
sociated with CSR or sustainability policies (Derwal & Koedijk, 2009:211). Thus, the 
presentation of the potential impact of corporate social performance on firm financial 
performance follows, including investor characteristics, the rationale behind their choic-
es, and their influence on the marketplace for securities worldwide. 
 
It seems that CSR and sustainability activities effect on the company performance is 
highly complex. This study suggests that companies that have adopted CSR or sustaina-
bility practices might have advantage with respect to companies that have not applied 
CSR or sustainability practices into company policies. Since the studies investigating 
CSR’s impact on the company’s performance have not provided solid results, the CSR’s 
impact on company’s riskiness is examined in this study. To investigate CSR’s impact 
on company riskiness, the cost of equity capital company is used. The cost of equity 
capital is the return that the markets require for their investment in a company, which 
therefore allows investigation of the market valuation of companies that have adopted 
CSR practices. In addition, CSR’s effect on the firm financing seems to be dependent 
on the investigator proxy (Hill et al., 2007), while the cost of equity provides infor-
mation whether CSR is priced on the capital markets.  
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 Hypothesis 1.1.
 
The scope for this study is to examine whether companies that have adopted CSR prac-
tices benefit from lower financing costs. The financing costs are measured with cost of 
equity capital, which is the return that stockholders require for their investment in a 
company. Since investors require higher return for riskier investments compared to 
more secured investments, the cost of equity capital should be lower for less risky com-
panies. It is hypothesized in this study that companies with higher CSR involvement are 
less risky from market perspective. Thus, it is hypothesized that adopting CSR practices 
have decreasing effect on the cost of equity capital.  
 
H0:  CSR practices do not decrease the cost of equity capital.   
 
H1: CSR practices decrease the cost of equity capital.    
 
Since it is hypothesized that CSR practices decrease company’s cost of equity, and 
therefore decrease company’s risk level, it is further hypothesized that involvement in 
controversial business areas increase company’s riskiness. It is emphasized that compa-
nies that operate in controversial business areas have higher risk for e.g. reputational 
harm, which may cause valuation losses. Thus, it is hypothesized that the markets re-
quire higher cost of equity capital (internal rate of return) from companies that operate 
with controversial businesses since investors bear higher risk and thus require higher 
return for their investment. 
 
H0: Involvement in controversial business does not increase the cost of equity capital.  
 
H1: Involvement in controversial business areas increases the cost of equity capital.   
 
To expand the scope of this study, CSR’s impact on the cost of equity capital is exam-
ined during the financial crisis period 2007-2009. During the latest financial crisis the 
overall volatility (riskiness) on the markets increased exponentially. The uncertainty 
increased during the financial crisis and it is hypothesized that markets have seen com-
panies that have invested in CSR more stable and less risky investment. Thus, it is also 
hypothesized that CSR has decreasing effect on the cost of equity capital during the fi-
nancial crisis period. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that the decreasing effect is greater 
during the economic downturn compared to pre-crisis and post-crisis period because 
investors try to seek less risky investments during increased volatility. 
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H0: CSR practices do not decrease company’s cost of equity capital during financial cri-
sis compared to post-crisis period and pre-crisis period.   
 
H1: CSR practices decrease company’s cost of equity capital during financial crisis 
compared to post-crisis period and pre-crisis period.   
 
Also the companies with controversial business issues are examined during the financial 
crisis period. Since the riskiness increased during the financial crisis period, it is ex-
pected that companies that the involvement in controversial business areas have in-
creased the cost of equity capital more during the financial crisis compared to other pe-
riods. Thus, companies involved in controversial business areas are hypothesized to 
have higher cost of equity capital during the financial crisis compared to pre-crisis and 
post-crisis period due to the increased riskiness on the markets.  
 
H0:  Involvement in controversial business does not increase company’s cost of equity 
capital during financial crisis compared to pre-crisis and post-crisis period.   
 
H1:  Involvement in controversial business areas increases company’s cost of equity 
capital during financial crisis compared to pre-crisis and post-crisis period.   
 
The methodology to test the hypotheses is presented in chapter 3, and the results are 
provided in chapter 4.  
 
 
 Purpose of the study 1.2.
 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether corporations’ benefit from their acts to 
improve practices to respond responsibility criteria. The focus of this study is to exam-
ine CSR and sustainability efforts’ impact on company’s riskiness from market perspec-
tive. Thus, the aim of this study is to find out how capital markets price companies’ re-
sponsibility attempts. The relation between CSR and company’s valuation is examined 
with the implied ex ante cost of equity capital by using analyst forecasts on earnings. 
This way the capital markets’ future expectations are controlled. The companies with 
higher CSR commitment are compared to companies with low CSR. In addition, this 
study examines whether companies with CSR activities bear the bear the crisis and 
higher volatility periods better compared to companies with lacks in CSR.  
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The CSR demands towards companies are here to stay. Although one would not want to 
consider CSR activities as a part of company’s business, there might be consequences 
that damage company’s reputation or valuation if CSR practices are not fulfilled. Thus, 
there is an increasing literature that examines CSR’s impact on firm valuation, firm per-
formance and firm riskiness. The CSR studies have not been able to solve by what 
means of CSR actually effects on company’s valuation. Furthermore, there is a dilemma 
between the investments in CSR activities and companies’ value creation, since CSR is 
often seen rather as expenditure than as investment. Yet, rapidly increasing amount of 
companies have their own CSR values and are allocating funds to CSR practices. There-
fore, there should be a relation between CSR and firm valuation. 
 
This study attempts to proof the findings of El Ghoul et al. (2011) that companies that 
have invested in CSR activities benefit from lower cost of equity capital. In addition, 
there is some evidence (e.g. Lackmann, Ernstberg & Stich, 2012) that companies that 
have invested in CSR practices perform better during economic downturn. Thus, this 
study extends El Ghoul et al. (2011) research by hypothesising that if CSR effects on 
the cost of equity capital, companies that have applied CSR should benefit from lower 
cost of equity capital also during the financial crisis period. To capture the effect of 
CSR practices on the cost of equity capital this study compares three different sub-
periods: pre-crisis period, crisis period, and post-crisis period. 
 
It is emphasized that the CSR demands most often come outside the company and from 
the stakeholders. Therefore, the market perspective should also be examined, and this 
study uses analyst forecasts on earnings to capture the market proxy. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter two discuss past studies 
and theories. In chapter three, the data and methods are processed. Chapter four and five 
cover results and conclusions.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter analyses the previous literature behind CSR, stakeholder theory and the ex 
ante cost of equity capital. Sub-chapter 2.1 briefly discusses about how CSR has be-
come part of the corporate culture, and in sub-chapter 2.2 the stakeholder theory is re-
viewed. Sub-chapter 2.3 analyses the relation between CSR and the company riskiness, 
while the cost of equity capital is further reviewed in sub-chapter 2.4. Finally, the mod-
els used to investigate CSR’s impact on the cost of equity capital are presented, and ef-
ficient market theory is shortly reviewed in sub-chapter 2.5. 
 
 
 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 2.1.
 
The concept of CSR has come a long way from its early origins. The modern theory of 
CSR begins from the 1950s as a scholarship that demanded companies’ to strengthen 
their sense of responsibility about social issues (e.g. the welfare of the labour and socie-
ty). CSR literature expanded rapidly during the 1960s and escalated during the 1970s 
leading to acceleration of concepts and methods. In the 1980s the CSR studies concen-
trated on decreasing the definitions and increasing the empirical research, which pro-
duced alternative themes such as corporate social performance (CSP), stakeholder theo-
ry and business ethics theory in the 1980s.  During the 1990s CSP, business ethics and 
stakeholder theory achieved positions as the most fundamental themes related to CSR. 
(Carrol, 1999.) 
 
During the past three decades the concerns about CSR have risen significantly. CSR has 
become a common part of legislation and corporations’ business. Despite the continuous 
research and the recent activation of the CSR research, there is still an abundance of 
CSR definitions. Since companies are often seen as a part of the society, they are there-
fore also often thought to be responsible to improve social welfare. Thus, the common 
description of CSR is, that it is an activity, which intends to improve social welfare 
(Barnett, 2007: 795). However, attempts to develop unbiased definition, which would 
define CSR activities more fundamentally and practically are challenging, since unbi-
ased interests will create definitions that might exclude problems (Dahlsrud, 2008:1).  
 
However, World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) (Petkoski & Twose, 
2003:2) has succeeded to define CSR undisputedly as a hybrid that ”covers a wide range 
of issues relating to business conduct, from corporate governance and environmental 
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protection, to issues of social inclusion, human rights and national economic develop-
ment.” Moreover, United Nations’ World Commission defines sustainability as a “de-
velopment that meets the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (United 
Nations, 1987:37) and it is the most common definition of sustainability. Therefore, 
companies implementing CSR and/or sustainability principles into their company poli-
cies have to consider both environmental and social aspects. 
 
The concept of sustainability has ascended as a one of the most observable trend of 
CSR. The recent interest towards sustainability results from the establishment of sus-
tainability indexes such as Dow Jones Sustainability Index family (DJSI), FTSE4Good 
Index and Domini 400 Social Index. The foundation of these indexes is consequence 
from progressive growth of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI). Thus, CSR has de-
veloped from including mainly social issues, to cover sustainable features such as re-
source and emission reduction.  
 
The establishment of the sustainability indexes and investor proxy may offer a new, in-
teresting insight on ethical investing and has motivated the most recent and more theo-
retically oriented studies to examine CSR’s influence on firm performance (e.g. Derwal 
& Koedijk, 2009; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Nelling & Webb, 2008; Orlitzky, 
Schmidt & Rynes, 2003; Pätäri, Arminen, Tuppura & Jantunen, 2014; Van de Velde, 
Vermeir & Corten, 2005). In these studies the impact of adoption of CSR practices on 
the firm performance and valuation is emphasized. This approach is the motivation of 
this study and the relationship between CSR and firm valuation (the implied cost of eq-
uity capital) will be elaborated subsequently.   
 
 
 Stakeholder theory 2.2.
 
The most important objective for a company is generally identified to maximize share-
holders’ value by increasing company’s stock value in the long-term. The studies have 
not been able to fully explain whether companies actually benefit from investing in CSR 
activities, and therefore a question remains: why should companies invest in CSR if this 
does not increase shareholders’ value? Stakeholder theory challenges the perspective, 
that company’s only goal is to maximize the value of the company by arguing that other 
parties including such as employees, customers, suppliers, financiers, communities, 
governmental bodies, political groups, and trade unions should be also considered (e.g. 
Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004). 
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The reason behind companies’ investments in CSR activities might be explained with 
stakeholder theory, which suggests that also other groups than stakeholders also review 
companies’ activities (Freeman et al., 2004). Therefore, to outperform the competitors 
companies need to consider other factors than the maximization of firm value. However, 
the classification of what groups are considered to be stakeholders are highly contested 
(Miles, 2012), and therefore, there is no explicit allocation for the stakeholders.  
 
Even though the previous literature is not able to explicitly show which of the groups 
are companies’ most important stakeholders, many of these stakeholders (e.g. politi-
cians, communities, customers and governmental) demand companies to be CSR com-
pliant. Therefore, it is hypothesized in this study that CSR policies and demands effect 
on companies through various stakeholders, which might be one reason for companies 
to increase their involvement in CSR. However, even if stakeholders impact on the 
amount how much companies invest in CSR activities, the question whether CSR is 
priced by the markets remains open. 
 
 
 CSR’s impact on firm performance and riskiness 2.3.
 
As emphasized before, during recent years relationship between application of 
CSR/sustainability practices and firm performance has become a current topic in finan-
cial literature. The demand for higher sustainability is resulted from both social and reg-
ulatory pressure, which companies are exposed to. Moreover, the actions of a company 
are constantly under shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ evaluation. Therefore, there 
might be critical influences on firm’s value if it is revealed that sustainability practices 
are not fully applied.  
 
Several studies (e.g. Carrol, 1999; De Bakker, Groenewegen & De Hond, 2005; Michel-
son, Wailes, Laan & Frost, 2004) have focused on forming theoretical proxy for the re-
lationship between CSR and firm performance. These approaches illustrate theoretical 
and methodological problems that obtain, when the relationship between CSR and firm 
performance is under examination. The main problems in the CSR literature are vague 
clarification of the relationship between CSR and firm performance, variant views on 
CSR measurements and lack of essential progress (De Bakker et al., 2005:284). There-
fore, these deficiencies will be carefully considered in this study.    
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Many of the previous studies have concentrated on the association between CSR and 
company’s financial performance (e.g. Roman et al., 1999; Lopéz, Garcia & Rodriguez; 
2007; Morgolis & Walsh, 2001; Jiao, 2010; Kim & Statman, 2012). However, the re-
sults of these studies vary extensively. Roman et al. (1999) make an introductory re-
search to compare the results of the previous studies to observe the relationship between 
CSR and firm performance. They suggest that the correlation between CSR and firm 
performance is neutral or slightly positive, and disclose with a claim that good CSR 
does not lead to poor firm performance (Roman et al., 1999:121).  
 
Lopéz et al. (2007) examine the impact of CSR on firm performance by comparing ac-
counting indicators of companies included in Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) to 
companies that are only listed in Dow Jones Global Index (DJGI), but not on DJSI. 
They find that applying CSR practices into company policy may increase costs and 
harm company’s current asset allocation placing responsible companies into disad-
vantage with respect to others (Lopéz et al., 2007:296). This disadvantage is shown as a 
negative short-term influence on firm performance compared to the companies that have 
not applied CSR practices (Lopéz et al., 2007:296). However, Lopéz et al. (2007: 296) 
find that CSR’s negative impact on firm performance will diminish during time.  
 
Also Consolandi, Jaiswal-Dale, Poggiani & Vercelli (2008:195) compare companies 
included in DJSI to companies that are only included in DJGI finding that DJSI hardly 
outperforms DJGI. However, they find that the inclusion (good news) in DJSI has a 
positive impact on firm performance, while the deletion (bad news) from DJSI has a 
negative impact on firm performance. Moreover, the negative impact of the deletion 
from the ethical index is more substantial compared to the positive impact from inclu-
sion into DJSI (Consolandi et al., 2008:195).  
 
Lackmann et al. (2012:136) find that stocks have abnormal returns if additional reliabil-
ity of sustainability information, concerning the stocks in question, has been revealed. 
Moreover, they find that the benefits from the additional reliability of sustainability in-
formation is specially greater at companies with higher systematic stock return risk with 
respect to companies with lower investment risk. Also companies with less predictable 
future stock performance have greater benefits from additional reliability information 
(Lackmann et al., 2012:136).  
 
In additional, Lackmann et al. (2012:136) make an interesting observation about the re-
lationship between reliability of sustainability information and overall economic envi-
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ronmental. They find that during economic downturns and times of uncertainty the ben-
efits of the reliability of sustainability information are greater. Thus, it is hypothesized 
in this study that companies with higher CSR involvement benefit from lower cost of 
equity capital.  
 
The chances in CSR concerns seem to have similar negative impact on financial per-
formance and profitability than deletion from DJSI. The changes in CSR strengths do 
not however appear to have any significant impact on firm performance nor profitabil-
ity. Yet, changes in CSR strengths and CSR concerns both have Granger cause changes 
in market value, while the impact of changes in CSR strengths seems to have a shorter 
lag than the lag of CSR concerns. However, the lag in CSR strengths starts from one 
year implicating that adoption of CSR practices has a long-term impact on firm perfor-
mance. (Pätäri et al., 2014:147.) 
 
The results show that there is Granger causality between the CSR strengths/concerns 
and company performance (Pätäri, Arminen, Tuppura & Jantunen, 2014:142). CSR 
strengths involve companies’ actions that might have a positive social impact, while 
CSR concerns are afflicted with companies actions that might harm society (Pätäri et 
al., 2014:146). Both Consolandi et al. (2008) and Pätäri et al. (2014) find that the impact 
of bad news is greater on firm performance in respect with good news. These results are 
consistent with the previous results from behavioural finance stating that behavioural 
response to bad news is typically more powerful than the reaction to good news (e.g. 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
 
In addition to the results indicating that adopting CSR practices into company policies 
has a positive impact on firm performance, CSR also seems to have a positive impact on 
Tobin’s Q. Jiao (2010:2560) find that an increase of one unit in welfare (CSR) score 
leads to a 0.587 gain in Tobin’s Q. This finding supports the hypothesis that applying 
CSR practices into company policy will increase company valuation.  
 
Kim & Statman (2012:128) examine the association between changes in corporate envi-
ronmental responsibility (CER) and changes in firm performance. The examination is 
conducted with Tobin’s Q and ROA. When the changes in CER and firm performance 
are measured, the results suggest that investments in CER are increased or decreased to 
enhance firm performance (Kim & Statman, 2012:128).  
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Moreover, Kim & Statman (2012) suggest that companies that changed (in-
creased/decreased) their levels of investments in CER practices enjoyed increases in 
firm performance compared to companies that did not change the levels of investments 
in CER. This finding is contradictory with the results of Consolandi et al. (2008) and 
Pätäri et al. (2014), who find that decreasing CSR activity will also decrease the level of 
firm performance.  
 
It can be easily noted that studies about the impact of applying CSR practices into com-
pany policies has increased rapidly in recent years. However, studies that examine the 
relation between CSR and firm performance fail to offer an absolute answer by which 
channel CSR actually impacts. Many of the studies show that there is a relation between 
CSR and firm performance in some level (Lopez et al., 2007; Consolandi et al., 2008; 
Lackman et al., 2012; Pätäri et al. 2014) and there seems to be evidences that companies 
benefit from applying CSR practices, while CSR concerns harm the company.  
 
Kim et al. (2014) have a different approach to study the CSR’s influence on company’s 
financial figure. They study whether there can be found a relation between adopting 
CSR practices and stock price crash risk. Kim et al. (2014:11) show that there is signifi-
cant negative relationship between CSR performance and one-year-ahead stock price 
risk. Interestingly, they find evidence that the mitigating impact of CSR on future stock 
price crash risk is associated with weak corporate governance (Kim et al., 2014:7). This 
finding suggests that companies with poor corporate governance benefit more from 
adopting CSR practices, since companies the impact of high CSR performance is not 
that significant on companies that have good corporate governance compared to compa-
nies with companies that do not have as strong corporate governance (Kim et al., 
2014:11). 
 
The latter finding is interesting, since it implies that the association between CSR activi-
ties and firm performance is more comprehensive. It seems that CSR has an indirect re-
lationship on company performance by better corporate governance. This is emphasized 
by the studies that show that only specific corporate governance related CSR factors 
lower the cost of equity (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2014) and that exclusion from 
DJSI index will lower firm performance (Consolandi et al., 2008:195), which can be 
seen as an implication as a decreased corporate governance level. Also the finding of 
Lackman et al. (2012:136) that increased reliability of sustainability information will 
enhance company’s performance is consistent with the benefits of good corporate gov-
ernance. 
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In addition to above discussed performance based studies, many studies examine the 
influence of CSR and corporate sustainability on company’s riskiness, and also thereby 
investigate the indirect impact on company’s internal performance. Also Lackmann et 
al. (2012), suggest that the impact of CSR might have an impact on company’s riskiness 
rather than it’s performance. In addition, Orlitzky et al. (2003:403) suggest that while 
companies benefit from adopting CSR and sustainability activities, the association be-
tween applying CSR practices into company policies and accounting-based measures is 
more significant than relationship between CSR and market-based indicators. 
 
E.g. El Ghoul (2011), Kempf & Osthoff (2007) and Sharfman & Fernando (2008) ex-
amine CSR’s impact on company’s riskiness. The results suggest that there is a relation 
between CSR and the cost of equity. Sharfman & Fernando (2008:582-586) examine 
how complying CSR affects on company’s weighted cost of capital (WACC). This ap-
proach is emphasized by the hypotheses that companies with higher CSR rates benefit 
from lower financing cost. Since companies are generally financed with both debt and 
equity, Shafman & Fernando use WACC as a measurement for risk.  
 
Shafman & Fernando (2008:582-586) find that environmental risk management leads to 
a lower cost of equity and is associated with decreased WACC. However, Shafman & 
Fernando (2008) fail to control the cost of debt-leverage ratio resulting biased results. 
Moreover, the variance of their data is remarkably high.  
 
Lee & Faff (2009) compare sustainability portfolio to the market portfolio finding sup-
porting evidence that companies that have adopted CSR and sustainability practices do 
not underperform the market portfolio. Furthermore, they state that companies with bet-
ter CSR performance benefit from significantly lower idiosyncratic risk that might be 
priced by global equity market. This indicates that CSR has an impact on company’s 
riskiness.    
 
Goss & Roberts (2009) have a quasi-insider approach to examine the impact of CSR on 
company’s riskiness. They use bank loans to compare the cost of debt between compa-
nies with poor CSR performance and companies with high CSR performance. The re-
sults of Goss & Roberts (2009) are similar to Lee & Faff’s (2009), and they find that 
most responsible companies have slightly lower cost of debt. Though the results of Goss 
& Robert (2009:2002) are statistically significant, they are economically moderate.  
However, Goss & Robert (2009) emphasize that further research is needed to determine 
the aspects how CSR adds value.  
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El Ghoul et al. (2011:2389) study the impact of CSR on the cost of equity capital by 
hypothesizing that if CSR or sustainability actions impact company’s riskiness, the 
company should have lower equity financing costs compared to companies without 
CSR or sustainability practices since the cost of capital is risk driven. This causality 
rests on a theory where market determines company’s future cash flows with discount 
rate on market perception of a company’s riskiness (Pratt & Niculita, 2008).  
 
El Ghoul et al. (2011:2400) find that introducing CSR practices will lower significantly 
companies’ cost of equity. Moreover, they find that the impacts of different dimensions 
of CSR on the cost of equity differ from each other. Investments in employee relations, 
environmental policies, and product strategies appear to lower the cost of equity, while 
community relations, diversity, and human rights do not yield similar results (El Ghoul 
et al., 2011:2401). Also Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find supporting evidence that companies 
with higher CSR benefit from lower cost of equity capital. 
 
As listed before, various studies have attempted to find an answer, whether CSR activi-
ties has an impact on firm performance or riskiness. Yet, it seems that CSR influences 
through information channels, which can be seen from the results that increasing CSR 
activities increases firm performance, while decreasing investments in CSR decreases 
the performance (e.g. Kim & Statman, 2012). In addition, bad CSR news has greater 
impact on firm performance than good CSR news (Pätäri et al. 2014). Thus, it seems 
that the market information prices the CSR.  
 
Even though there are many studies (e.g. Roman et al., 1999; Lopéz, Garcia & Rodri-
guez, 2007; Morgolis & Walsh, 2001; Jiao, 2010; Kim & Statman, 2012) that examine 
the relation between CSR and firm performance, the results of these studies remain in-
adequate. Thus, it is emphasized in this study that since CSR activities are demanded 
through various stakeholders, the capital markets have the power to determine the level 
of influence that CSR has on the company’s business. Furthermore, the capital markets 
prices the companies through risk premium, which is added to the risk free rate. The 
amount of premium depends on the riskiness of the company, and therefore companies 
with higher CSR activities should have lower risk level if CSR is seen as a positive in-
vestment by the markets. 
 
This study investigates CSR’s impact on company’s riskiness rather than its perfor-
mance. This way the markets’ perspective and expectations are included into the exami-
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nation. In addition, the previous studies show that bad or negative CSR news impact 
negatively on company’s valuation. Therefore, the companies involved in controversial 
business issues are also investigated, and the cost of equity capital of the “good” and 
“bad” companies is compared. The theoretical background of the cost of equity capital 
is discussed in the following sub-chapter. 
 
 
 Cost of equity capital 2.4.
 
The studies that examine the relationship between CSR and firm performance suggest 
that CSR affects firm’s account based risk factors such as cost of equity capital (e.g. 
Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al, 2011; Lackmann et al., 2012; Orlitzky et al. 2003) 
rather than firm’s external performance. This study uses the implied cost of equity capi-
tal (ICC) to determine whether CSR impacts on the riskiness of a company. To examine 
whether companies that have adopted CSR practices outperform companies that have 
not invested in CSR, the cost of equity capital is compared between these companies.  
 
Cost of equity capital is the internal rate of return (discount rate) that is applied to com-
pany’s future cash flows to determine its current market value. Therefore, cost of equity 
represents the required rate of return from the market’s perspective and thus, equals to 
the investigators’ experience of company’s riskiness. Being equal to the compensation 
that the market demands in exchange for owning the asset and bearing the risk, cost of 
equity represents market’s expectation of stock’s valuation. If CSR and sustainability 
practices have an impact on the perceived riskiness of the company, then socially re-
sponsible companies should benefit from lower equity financing costs. Moreover, stud-
ies (e.g. Hail and Leuz, 2006; Chen, Chen & Chen, 2009) show that companies with 
competent corporate governance and stricter disclosure standards benefit from lower 
company’s cost of equity capital and information asymmetry problems.  
 
The cost of capital is used as a depending factor in this study because the empirical re-
sults of applying CAPM when estimating cost of equity have failed to show accurate 
results. Furthermore, CAPM is rather a fundamental model that should be improved 
with more complicated models (Fama & French, 2004:44). In addition, single-factor 
model and the Fama & French (1993) three-factor model offer poor proxies for the cost 
of equity capital (Fama & French, 1997).  Moreover, Elton (1999) states that realized 
returns offer biased estimates to expected returns and neglect significant future infor-
mation events. Thus, there is a need for alternative methods. 
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Recent studies show that ICC separates the cost of capital effects from cash flow effects 
and growth effects (Heil & Leuz, 2006, 2009; Chen et al., 2009), and therefore ICC 
provides more accurate predictions than estimations based on realized returns.  In addi-
tion, Pástor, Sinha & Swaminathan (2008) find that ICC outperforms the methods that 
use realized returns in determining the nexus between increase in return and increase in 
risk (risk-return trade-off).  
 
Studies shows that traditional models (i.e. CAPM, three factor model, four factor mod-
el) that rely on realized estimates provide unavoidably imprecise results, and the empir-
ical problems involved in these models might invalidate their use in applications (e.g. 
Fama & French, 1997, 2004). E.g. Fama & French (1997) test extensively CAPM and 
three-factor based industry cost of capital, concluding that the use of realized returns 
yields inaccurate cost of capital estimates. The obstacles with models based on realized 
returns have awakened the researchers to study alternative methods for computing the 
required rate of return. The ex ante ICC has become to an attractive method to compute 
the cost of equity capital disposing the problems related to the use of realized returns 
(e.g. Claus & Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt, Lee, & Swaminathan, 2001).  
 
To estimate company’s ICC, this study follows recent branch of studies (e.g. Claus & 
Thomas, 2001; Hail & Leuz, 2006; Chen et al., 2009) and adopt ex ante cost of capital 
implied in analyst earnings forecasts and stock prices. Using ICC, and thus having an 
internal rate of return based approach can avoid two major problems. Firstly, since the 
ex ante analysts earnings forecasts is used, growth rates and expected cash flows can be 
controlled when estimating company’s cost of equity unlike with traditional measures of 
firm value (e.g. Tobin’s Q) (Hail & Leuz, 2006:524-525). Secondly, as emphasized pre-
viously, various studies have shown that realized returns provide noisy results (e.g. 
Fama & French, 2004; Elton, 1999; Pástor, et al., 2008) and traditional capital asset 
pricing models fail to deliver accurate estimates of firm level (e.g. Pástor, 2008:2860). 
However, the use of ICC can prevent these problems. Since ICC does not rely on real-
ized returns, but uses analyst earnings forecast and stock prices, the noisy proxy can be 
avoided.  
 
The idea behind ICC is to calculate the cost of capital as the internal rate of return with 
a valuation model that equates the present value of future dividends or income streams 
with the current market price. The greatest difference between ICC methods and CAPM 
is that instead of using ex post returns for ex ante valuation to compute empirical im-
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plementations, ICC methods rely on forecasted, forward looking data. Furthermore, ICC 
literature assumes that the efficient market theory is applied, and the equity value of a 
company is set equal to the quoted share price. Moreover, expected dividends, earnings, 
book values (numerator), and growth expectations are inserted into an accounting-based 
valuation formula that determines the discount factor, which is equal to market’s ex-
pected rate of return. (Echterling, Eierle & Ketterer, 2015:236.) 
 
The ICC literature has expanded during the resent decade, but there is no consensus 
among researchers, which of the approaches performs best, how shortcomings can be 
mitigated, or how methods can be evaluated adequately (Echterling, et al., 2015). Con-
sequently, even though the use of ICC provides an attractive alternative method to stock 
price valuation, it has its problems in the heterogeneous methods of computing ICC. 
The most common approaches are – in no specific order – (1) the dividend discount 
model (Gordon & Gordon, 1997; Botosan & Plumplee, 2002), (2) the residual income 
valuation model (Claus & Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001, Daske, Gebhardt & 
Klein, 2006), and (3) the abnormal earnings growth model (Easton, 2004; Ohlson & 
Juettner-Nauroth, 2005). These three models are examined more thoroughly in the fol-
lowing sub-chapters, and the advantages and obstacles concerning the models are dis-
cussed. 
 
2.4.1. Dividend discount models 
 
In the dividend discount models the share price is valuated by using predicted dividends 
that are discounted back to present value. Gordon & Gordon (1997) use a finite horizon 
expected return model that is a basic dividend discount model assuming that firms do 
not earn excess returns beyond a finite forecast horizon. Moreover, they assume that 
beyond this finite horizon a return on equity investment equals to the cost of equity cap-
ital and the price is no longer dependent on the dividend policy. In addition, Gordon & 
Gordon (1997:54) hypothesise that when the retention rate (the percentage of the net 
income that is retained to grow the business) is zero or equivalent, a full distribution of 
earnings takes place.   
 
 
 
 (1) 𝑃! = !!(!!!)!(!!!!!)!!!!! + !!(!!!)!!!!(!!!!!)! 
Gordon & Gordon (1997). 
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where, 
 𝑃! = current price of the share 𝐷! = expected dividend yield in period t 𝑔 = expected growth rate of the dividend 𝐸! = expected normalized earnings per share in period t 𝑘!! = the return on equity investment = cost of equity capital 
 
Botosan & Plumplee (2002) use target price (𝑃) method and combine the forecasted 
dividends for the first four periods to compute the cost of equity capital that is, similarly 
to Gordon & Gordon’s (1997) model, equal to return on equity investment. The target 
price is the mean of the minimum and maximum long-run price forecasts and it operates 
as a substitute for terminal value estimations. 
 
 
(2)  𝑃! = !!(!!!!")!!!!! + !!(!!!!")! 
Botosan & Plumplee (2002). 
where, 
 𝑃! = price at date t 𝐷! = dividends per share for year t 𝑃! = mean of the minimum and maximum long-run price forecasts 𝑘!" = expected cost of equity capital 
 
The problem with the dividend discount models is that they recognise less value during 
the forecasting period and more value within the terminal value. Therefore, they exhibit 
higher sensitivity to assumed growth rate in perpetuity and thus, they are more vulnera-
ble to uncertainty (Echterling, et al., 2015). Moreover, e.g. Corteau, Kao, & Richardson 
(2001) and Francis, Olsson & Oswald (2000) show that the residual income valuation 
models’ valuation errors are minor than the errors in the dividend discount models. 
 
2.4.2. Residual income valuation models 
 
Claus & Thomas (2001) and Gebhardt et al. (2001) both use the residual income valua-
tion models to estimate the ICC. The strength in residual income valuation model lies in 
its ability to count the true cost of capital by measured as book value of the sharehold-
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er’s equity and the income that a company generates after accounting. Thus, residual 
income model attempts to provide more accurate value for the firm by adjusting the fu-
ture earnings estimates, and by compensating for the equity cost.  
 
To determine the ICC with the residual income valuation model, Claus & Thomas 
(2001:1642) use a five-year detailed plan horizon (𝑇 = 5) and consensus analysts’ fore-
casts of earnings. Moreover, they assume the long-term growth rate to be equal to the 
expected inflation rate, which is proxied by the risk free rate minus 3%.  In addition, 
Glaus & Thomas (2001) require clean surplus accounting according to which book val-
ues are calculated, and that firms have positive earnings forecasts for at least two years 
in the I/B/E/S database. The missing earnings forecasts for the remaining years are 
computed by the long-term growth rate from I/B/E/S (𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!! = 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!!(1+ 𝐿𝑇𝐺). 
The dividend pay-out ratio is assumed to be constant 50%. Claus & Thomas (2001) use 
the abnormal earnings model to subtract biased results, such as systematically optimistic 
expected dividend growth rate (𝑔) relative to realized earnings. 
 
 
(3)  𝑃! =  𝐵! +  !"!!!(!!!!")!!!!! + !"!!!(!!!)(!!"!!)(!!!!")!  
Claus & Thomas (2001:1642) 
where, 𝑎𝑒!!! = 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!! −  𝑘!"𝐵!!!!!  𝐵!!! = 𝐵!!!!! + 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!!(1− 𝐷𝑃𝑅!!!) 𝐷𝑃𝑅!!! = 0,5 𝑔 = 𝑟! − 0,3 𝑘!" = cost of equity capital 
 
 
Gebhardt et al. (2001) use similar approach than Claus & Thomas (2001) to estimate the 
ICC. In Gebhardt et al. (2001) residual income valuation model the detailed plan hori-
zon is set to three years, and the earnings for the first two periods are collected from 
I/B/E/S, while the third period’s earnings are calculated with the long-term growth rate 
from I/B/E/S (𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!! = 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!!!!(1+ 𝐿𝑇𝐺). Beyond the third period the return on 
equity linearly fades into the median industry return on equity by the twelfth year and 
remains constant thereafter. Gebhardt et al. (2001:142) emphasize that this method cap-
tures the long-term erosion of excess ROEs over the period and that individual firms 
tend to move towards their industry peers. Book values are calculated in accordance 
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with clean surplus accounting also in Gebhardt et al. (2001) model and the expected 
dividend pay-out ratio is assumed to be equal to 𝐷𝑃𝑆!/𝐸𝑃𝑆!. 
 
 
(4) 𝑃! = 𝐵! + !"#$!!!!!!"#(!!!!"#)!!!!!! 𝐵!!!!! + !"#$!!!!!!"#!!"#(!!!!"#)!!! 𝐵!!!!! 
 
Gebhardt et al. (2001:142) 
 
where, 𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸!!! = 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 + 𝜏, 𝐵!!! = 𝐵!!!!! + 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆 1− 𝐷𝑃𝑅!!! , 𝐷𝑃𝑅!!! = 𝐷𝑃𝑆 !/𝐸𝑃𝑆!, if 𝐸𝑃𝑆! <  0 → 𝐸𝑃𝑆! = 𝐿𝑇𝐺 𝑘!"# = cost of equity capital 
 
Daske et al. (2006) extend Gebhardt et al. (2001) residual income valuation model by 
explicitly allowing daily estimates. In addition, Daske et al. (2006) use only publicly 
available information at the estimation date (𝑠). Also Daske et al. (2006) use the I/B/E/S 
analyst forecasts to estimate the missing forecasts up to five years, and interpolate the 
return on equity to the median industry average between the years six and twelve. Both 
Gebhardt et al. (2001:166) and Daske et al. (2006:28) find evidence that the lagged in-
dustry risk premium has an explanatory power over variation of expected risk premium.  
 
 
(5)  𝑃! = 𝐸(𝑏𝑣𝑝𝑠!)+ !"#$!! !!!!"# !!!"#!! !"#$!!!!! !!!"# + !"#$!,!!!!"#∗!"#$!,!!!!!!!"# !!!"#!!!!  
 + !"#$!,!!!!"#)!!"#!,!!!!!!!"# !!!"#!!!!! + (!"#$!,!"!!!"#)!"#$!,!!!!"# !!!!"# !!!!"#  
Daske et al. (2006:6) 
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where, 
 𝐸(−) = expectation based on information available at time s, 𝑃! = price per share at estimation date s, 𝑏𝑣𝑝𝑠! = adjusted book value per share at estimation date s, 𝑏𝑣𝑝𝑠!,! = expected book value per share for the t-th full fiscal year after t at estimation 
date s, 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆! = adjusted forecasted earnings per share for current fiscal year at estimation date 
s,  𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!,! = forecasted earnings per share for current fiscal year ar estimation date t, 𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸!,! = forecasted (book-) return on equity for the t-th full fiscal year at estimation 
date s, 𝑘!"# = cost of equity capital, 𝑑 = number of days between estimation date s and t-th full fiscal year’s end. 
 
The outcomes of all of the previously listed studies that have used the residual income 
valuation model (Claus & Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Daske et al., 2006) are 
constant – it has potential to complement or even replace the traditional methods using 
realized returns. Moreover, Gebhardt et al.’s (2001) findings indicate that there could be 
a cross-sectional relation between estimated equity risk premium and firm/industry 
characteristic, such as B/M, forecasted long-term growth rate, and the dispersion in ana-
lyst earnings forecast. However, there is a concern that B/M and long-term analyst fore-
casted growth rate might rather represent market mispricing than market riskiness. Yet, 
the use of these variables is emphasized by the fact that even though the markets are not 
completely rational, the eventual market correction will occur over relatively long peri-
od (Gebhardt et al. 2001:171). In addition, Claus & Thomas (2001:1657) state that the 
I/B/E/S forecasts might be biased. Therefore, the forecasted earnings estimates should 
be computed from the I/B/E/S median consensus earnings.  
 
2.4.3. Abnormal earnings growth models 
 
The third approach to estimate ICC is abnormal earnings growth models, which provide 
different insight to firm valuation than residual income models by concentrating on 
earnings rather than book values. In addition, abnormal growth models do not require 
clean surplus as residual income models do. Since the clean surplus will not always lit-
erally hold on empirical environment, abnormal growth estimates are not exposed to 
multiple estimates in intrinsic values. 
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Several studies have applied abnormal earnings growth model, which is generally based 
on a two-year time horizon, and differing assumptions regarding cost of equity capital, 
dividend payout, and abnormal earnings. Easton (2004:73-74) uses simple price-to-
earnings ratio (𝑃/𝐸-ratio) as a proxy and expands it to price-to-earnings to growth ratio 
(𝑃𝐸𝐺-ratio). While 𝑃/𝐸-ratio assumes that there are no abnormal returns earned during 
the measuring period, or growth in abnormal earnings, 𝑃𝐸𝐺-ratio allows abnormal re-
turns to be earned during period two yet keeping the growth in abnormal earnings and 
the growth in dividend payout zero during the period one. 
 
(6)  𝑃! = !"#$!!!!!!"!"#!!!!!"#!!!!!"!  
Easton (2004:80) 
 
where, 𝐷𝑃𝑆!!! = 𝐷𝑃𝑆! = dividend during period 0, 𝐸𝑃𝑆!!! = actual earnings per share during in year 𝑡 + 1, 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!! = forecasted earnings per share for year 𝑘!" = cost of equity capital 
 
Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005:349-350) abandon the restriction regarding the zero 
growth in abnormal earnings and allow long-term growth in perpetuity, without general 
assumptions on earnings and dividend growth. The model assumes that share price is 
determined by the present value of dividend per share, and that there are no restrictions 
how the dividends should evolve during time. Thus, the short-term dividend adjusted 
growth in earnings is defined as a separate parameter in the valuation function (Ohlson 
& Juettner-Nauroth, 2005:353). 
 
 
(7)  𝐾!! = 𝐴 + 𝐴! + !"#$!!!!! 𝑔! − 𝛾 − 1  
Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005:359) 
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where, 𝐴 = !! ( 𝛾 − 1 + !"#!!!!!! ), 𝐷𝑃𝑆!!! = 𝐷𝑃𝑆!, 𝑔! = !"#!!"#! , 𝑆𝑇𝐺 = !"#$!!!!!"#$!!!!"#$!!! , 𝛾 − 1 = 𝑟! − 0,03, 𝑟! = risk free rate. 
 
Even though abnormal earnings growth models concentrate explicitly on earnings rather 
than book values, there are some evident biases in the estimations. Easton (2004:92-93) 
finds that 𝑃𝐸𝐺-ratio is useful in specific means of valuating firms, but the model pro-
vides biased results from for firms that have higher 𝑃𝐸, higher 𝑃𝐸𝐺-ratios, lower book-
to-price ratios, lower standard deviation of past returns, and higher market capitaliza-
tion. The model of Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005) prevents some of the problems 
that appear in Easton’s (2004) model. Yet they find that there are some circumstances 
where the assumptions for 𝛾, (which is assumed to be the difference between previous 
years’ earnings per share compared to current year’s earnings per share) is violated. 
 
 
2.5. CSR and cost of equity capital 
 
The theoretical approach to determine the ICC as the internal rate of return is basically 
the same in each of the above models. However, there are almost as many models to 
calculate to the ICC than there are studies related to it. To determine how to examine 
the CSR’s impact on ICC, some of the models need to be excluded. 
 
The studies show that the residual income models and abnormal earnings growth mod-
els outperform the dividend discount model in explaining the relation between value 
estimates and observable stock prices (e.g. Corteau et al., 2001; Francis et al., 2000). 
Moreover, since this study observes the CSR’s impact on ICC also during the financial 
crisis period, dividend discount model’s vulnerability to uncertainty is not preferred. 
 
The evidence whether residual income model performs better in empirical implementa-
tion than abnormal earnings growth model or opposite. Although, Lai (2015) investigate 
the Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth’s (2005) model and is able to theoretically show that 
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abnormal earnings growth models provide better proxy for the growth patterns and 
therefore outperform residual income models. Since the evidence about which of the 
models perform better remains yet modest, this study applies both residual income 
models and abnormal earnings growth models to determine the ICC. 
 
Thus, four models are selected to determine the ICC and to further study, whether com-
panies with higher CSR values have lower financing costs i.e. lower cost of equity capi-
tal. The use of four different models is emphasized with an assumption that various 
models will provide better proxy to reveal the ICC due to the fact that the researches 
have not been able to determine which of the models operates the best. Moreover, by 
using four different models the biases and shortcomings among different approaches 
can be mitigated.  
 
The studies have found that sustainability has long period impact (e.g. Lopez et al., 
2007; Pätäri et al., 2014) on stock prices. Since the model of Daske et al. (2006) uses 
daily estimates, and CSR is assumed to have long-term impact on firm’s cost of equity, 
models that use yearly data are preferred over models using daily data in this study. The 
models that have been left after excluding dividend discount model and use of daily es-
timates are two residual income models (Claus & Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001), 
and two abnormal earnings growth models (Eston, 2004; Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth, 
2005). Thus, this study follows Hail & Leuz (2006) and El Ghoul et al. (2011) studies to 
compute the ICC from the mean of four different models. 
 
Since the residual income models require clean surplus relation it is assumed later in 
this study that clean-surplus accounting holds. This means that the value of a stock can 
be expressed in terms of book value of equity plus the present value of residual earnings 
in the models that require clean surplus accounting. Moreover, all items that have influ-
ence on the book value of equity (excluding transactions with shareholders, e.g. divi-
dends and share repurchases/issues) have to be included in earnings. (e.g. Claus & 
Thomas, 2001:1635.)  
 
 
2.6. Efficient market theory  
 
To examine the impact of applying CSR/sustainability practices on the cost of equity 
capital it is assumed that the efficient market theory holds. The weak form of the effi-
cient market theory suggests that markets are purely random and any future chance in 
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security can’t be predicted with past prices. Under the semi-strong efficiency asset pric-
es fully reflect all publicly available market information, and anomalies are instantly 
adjusted away by the markets. Finally, the strong-form efficiency applies when all 
available public and inside information are fully reflected into stock prices and there-
fore, there is no additional information available that would benefit any investor. (Fama, 
1970.) 
 
The above described efficient market theory suggests that all information available will 
be immediately absorbed into stock value, and the stock price follows random walk. 
Therefore investors do not have the possibility to make abnormal profits on the market. 
It is hypothesized in this study, that efficient market theory holds and therefore markets 
will price companies that have applied CSR practices less risky, while companies with 
poor CSR performance are priced with higher cost of equity capital. This assumption is 
conducted with logic that markets will reward companies that do “good”, and punish the 
“bad” companies. 
 
However, empirical research have found anomalies, where the efficient market theory 
does not fully apply e.g. (1) momentum, where price keeps moving to the same direc-
tion rather than changing its direction (e.g. Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993; Jegadeesh & 
Titman, 2001; Fama & French, 2008); (2) overreacting/underreacting, where the market 
does not react to new information available (e.g. Fama, 1998; Hong & Stein, 1999; 
Frazzini, 2006); (3) small firms (smaller capitalization) outperforming the larger com-
panies (Fama & French, 1993; Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2004) and (4) low book 
to value -anomaly, where below average price-to-book ratio stocks tend to outperform 
the market (Fama & French, 1993; Zhang, 2005).  
 
The results of the studies CSR and sustainability practices’ impact on stock price are 
controversial. E.g. López et al. (2007:292 – 295) find that application of CSR practices 
has a negative short-term impact on firm performance.  In addition, Pätäri et al. (2014) 
results suggest that the CSR’s impact on the firm performance does not start immediate-
ly after the CSR announcements. The market anomalies (e.g. overreact-
ing/underreacting) might be one of the factors that cause these results, and complicate 
also the examination of the relation between CSR and company’s riskiness. 
 
The data and methodology are presented in next chapter 4. Thereafter the results are re-
viewed in chapter 5, and the conclusions are listed in chapter 6. 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents the data and methodology that are used to conduct this study. In 
sub-chapter 3.1 the sample construction is reviewed. Furthermore, the regression varia-
bles are presented in sub-chapter 3.2, and descriptive statistics for the regression varia-
bles are reported in sub-chapter 3.3. Finally, the methodologies to run the regressions 
are viewed in sub-chapter 3.4. 
 
 
 Sample construction 3.1.
 
This study examines the association between CSR and the cost of equity financing. The 
data is obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Datastream on Institutional Brokers 
Earnings Services (I/B/E/S) provides analyst forecast data, while Datastream on AS-
SET4 provides the CSR data. The industry affiliation and financial data and financial 
data are also obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
 
The methodology follows Gerdhardt et al. (2001), Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and El Ghoul 
et al. (2011) studies to produce the cost of equity capital, which itself is obtained from 
four different models developed by Claus & Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), 
Easton (2004), and Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005). To produce the estimate, the 
forecast data for all firms that have positive 1- and 2-year-ahead consensus earnings 
forecasts and a positive long-term growth forecast is extracted from the I/B/E/S sum-
mary file. Furthermore, it is required that each of the samples have positive I/B/E/S 
share price, positive book value per share, and that the firm belongs to one of the Fama 
& French (1997) 48 industries (El Ghoul et al., 2011:2390). Moreover, firms with inva-
lid cost of equity estimates under any of the four models or insufficient CSR and control 
variables are excluded.  
 
The above constrictions yield a sample of 4085 firm-year observations that represent 
404 unique companies between 2002 and 2013. The companies are divided by indus-
tries according to Fama & French (1997) 48 industry groups, and the division between 
industry and year is presented in Table 1. Business services, utilities, petroleum and 
natural gas, retail, electronic equipment, and insurance are the dominating industries as 
each of these industries are accounting for over 5% of the observations. It can be seen 
from the table that the coverage of CSR data increases linearly over the sample period, 
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and on 2012 the data is available for all firms in the sample. This indicates that the CSR 
activity has increased during resent years. 
 
Table 1. 
Sample breakdown by industry and year. 
The table presents sample composition by industry and year of the 4085 observations during 2002 – 2012. 
The industries are divided into Fama & French (1997) industry groups. 
 
 
 Regression variables 3.2.
 
To examine CSR’s impact on cost of equity, the implied cost of equity and CSR varia-
bles need to be yielded from the data available. This subchapter presents the methods 
how to produce the cost of equity capital estimates. Also the methods to produce the 
CSR variables are reported, and the firm specific control variables are reviewed. 
 
3.2.1. Cost of equity capital estimates 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the previous studies (Fama & French, 1997, 2004; Elton, 
1999; Claus & Thomas, 2001) do not tempt to use realized returns as a proxy for esti-
mating cost of equity capital. Thus, this research follows Hail & Leuz (2006), Dhaliwal 
et al. (2011) El Ghoul et al. (2011) studies which estimate the cost of equity capital, and 
Industry N % Industry N %
Agriculture 0 0,00 Personal services 1 0,25
Food products 12 2,97 Business services 33 8,17
Candy and soda 5 1,24 Computers 12 2,97
Beer and liquor 3 0,74 Electronic Equipment 24 5,94
Tobacco products 1 0,25 Measuring and control equipment 10 2,48
Recreation 2 0,50 Business supplies 5 1,24
Entertainment 2 0,50 Shipping containers 1 0,25
Printing and publishing 2 0,50 Transportation 13 3,22
Consumer goods 9 2,23 Wholesale 14 3,47
Apparel 3 0,74 Retail 29 7,18
Healthcare 5 1,24 Restauraunts, hotels and motels 8 1,98
Medical equipment 13 3,22 Banking 13 3,22
Phamaceutical products 16 3,96 Insurance 21 5,20
Chemicals 13 3,22 Real Estate 2 0,50
Rubber and plastic products 1 0,25 Trading 20 4,95
Textiles 1 0,25 Almost Nothing 3 0,74
Construction materials 5 1,24 Total 404 100,00
Construction 3 0,74
Steel works etc. 2 0,50 Year N %
Fabricated products 0 0,00 2002 220 5,39
Machinery 14 3,47 2003 220 5,39
Electrical equipment 0 0,00 2004 283 6,93
Automobiles and trucks 6 1,49 2005 330 8,08
Aircraft 3 0,74 2006 335 8,20
Shiplbuilding and railroad equipment 0 0,00 2007 358 8,76
Defense 0 0,00 2008 381 9,33
Precious metals 1 0,25 2009 389 9,52
Non-metallic and industrial metal mining 1 0,25 2010 395 9,67
Coal 1 0,25 2011 401 9,82
Petroleum and natural gas 29 7,18 2012 404 9,89
Utilities 33 8,17 2013 369 9,03
Communication 9 2,23 4085 100,00
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further equity premium, by using four different models based on ex ante cost of equity 
implied in current stock prices and forecast analysis.  
 
Recent studies show that implied cost of equity (ICC) separates the cost of capital ef-
fects from cash flow effects and growth effects (Heil & Leuz, 2006, 2009; Chen et al., 
2009), and therefore ICC provides more accurate predictions than estimations based on 
realized returns.  In addition, Pástor et al. (2008) find that ICC outperforms the methods 
that use realized returns in determining the nexus between increase in return and in-
crease in risk (risk-return trade-off). Yet, the recent literature has not been able to detect 
the most efficient model(s), and therefore, the use of four different models is empha-
sized. Moreover, the use of different models will eliminate any deficiencies in individu-
al models. 
 
The four models used in this study are (1) the Claus & Thomas (2001) model (CT), (2) 
the Gebhardt et al. (2005) model (GLS), (3) the Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
model (OJ), and (4) the Easton (2004) model (ES). After computing the cost of equity 
capital with each of the models, the 10-year US Treasury bond yield is deducted from it 
to yield the cost of equity premium. These cost of equity premiums computed from the 
four models are denoted as rCT, rGLS, rOJ, and rES respectively. The four equations for 
computing cost of equity capital are presented below. 
 
Since all of the four models use somewhat similar variables, the most commonly used 
variables are listed: 
 𝑃! = stock price in year t 𝐷𝑃𝑆! = actual dividend per share in year  𝑡 − 1 𝐸𝑃𝑆! = actual earnings per share in year 𝑡 − 1 𝐿𝑇𝐺 =  long-term growth forecast in year t 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!! = forecasted earnings per share for year t+τ recorded in year t 𝐵! = book value per share at the beginning of the year t 𝑟! = yield on a 10-year Treasury note in year t 
 
In addition, two of the models require the over two-year-earning forecast.  Since over 
two-year-earning forecast is not available for all firms in I/B/E/S, the forecast is yielded 
from the previous year’s forecast and the long-term growth forecast: 
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(8) 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!! =  𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!!(1+ 𝐿𝑇𝐺) 
El Ghoul et al. (2011:2401). 
 
Model 1: Claus & Thomas (2001)  
 
In Claus & Thomas (2001) model the share price is expressed in forecasted residual 
earnings and book values. To allow this assumption, clean surplus accounting is re-
quired. As seen from the below equation, the explicit forecast window is set to 5 years. 
After this, the forecasted residual earnings growth is equal to expected inflation rate and 
dividend pay-out ratio is a constant 50%. The cost of equity capital is obtained by 
searching for the right value for 𝑘!" that balances the right-hand-side and the left-hand 
side of the equation. The valuation equation is given by: 
 
(9) 𝑃! =  𝐵! +  !"!!!(!!!!")!!!!! + !"!!!(!!!)(!!"!!)(!!!!")!  
Claus & Thomas (2001:1642) 
 
where 𝑎𝑒!!! = 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!! −  𝑘!"𝐵!!!!! 𝐵!!! = 𝐵!!!!! + 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!!(1− 𝐷𝑃𝑅!!!) 𝐷𝑃𝑅!!! = 0,5 𝑔 = 𝑟! − 0,3 
 
Model 2: Gebhardt et al. (2001) 
 
Also in the Gebhardt et al. (2001) model the clean surplus accounting is assumed to be 
valid, to allow share price to be expressed in terms of forecasted returns on equity 
(ROE) and book values.  Again, the equation is balanced by finding the right value for 𝑘!"#. The valuation equation is given by: 
 
(10) 𝑃! = 𝐵! + !"#$!!!!!!"#(!!!!"#)!!!!!! 𝐵!!!!! + !"#$!!!!!!"#!!"#(!!!!"#)!!! 𝐵!!!!! 
Gebhardt et al. (2001) 
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where 𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸!!! = 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 + 𝜏 𝐵!!! = 𝐵!!!!! + 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆 1− 𝐷𝑃𝑅!!!  𝐷𝑃𝑅!!! =  !"#!!"#!, if 𝐸𝑃𝑆! <  0,𝐸𝑃𝑆! = 𝐿𝑇𝐺 
 
For the first 3 years, 𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸!!! is set equal to 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!!/𝐵!!!!!, where 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!! is the 
I/B/E/S mean forecasted EPS for the year 𝑡 + 𝜏 and 𝐵!!!!! is the book value per share 
for the year 𝑡 + 𝜏 − 1. After the third year 𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐸 is forecasted using the linear interpo-
lation and it fades linearly to the industry median 𝑅𝑂𝐸 by the 12th year. The industry 
allocation follows Fama & Franch (1997) industry classification and the median indus-
try ROE is calculated over the past 12 years excluding loss firms. The expected divi-
dend payout ratio 𝐷𝑃𝑅!!! is set equal to 𝐷𝑃𝑆!/𝐸𝑃𝑆!. The highest extreme values are 
winsorized at 20 percent rate. 
 
Model 3: Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005): 
 
Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005) apply constant growth model to estimate the ICC. It 
is a generalization of Gordon (1962) dividend growth that implies that the expected rate 
of return on the stock market (𝑘∗) equals the forward dividend yield (𝑑!/𝑝!) plus the 
expected dividend growth rate in perpetuity (𝑔). Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005) ex-
pand Gordon’s (1962) model by introducing shot-term and long-term growth and cost 
of capital in to the estimation. The equation assumes that dividend per share (DPS) de-
termines the share price but it does not restrict how it should evolve. Thus, the equation 
expresses ICC as a function of the estimated earnings per share to price, and as two 
measures of growth. The valuation equation is given by: 
 
 
(11) 𝐾!! = 𝐴 + 𝐴! + !"#$!!!!! 𝑔! − 𝛾 − 1  
Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005:359) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
where, 𝐴 = 12 ( 𝛾 − 1 + 𝐷𝑃𝑆!!!𝑃!0 ) 𝐷𝑃𝑆!!! = 𝐷𝑃𝑆! 𝑔! = 𝑆𝑇𝐺 + 𝐿𝑇𝐺2  𝑆𝑇𝐺 = 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!! − 𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!!𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆!!!  𝛾 − 1 = 𝑟! − 0,03. 
 
Model 4: Easton (2004) 
 
Easton (2004) uses a generalization of Price-Earnings-Growth (PEG) model, where the 
earnings growth of a company is also controlled in addition to price and earnings. In this 
model share price is expressed in terms of 1-year-ahead and 2-year-ahead earnings fore-
casts. The explicit forecast horizon is set to 2-years, and after this forecasted abnormal 
returns are assumed to grow in perpetuity at constant rate. In addition to positive 1-year-
ahead and 2-year-ahead earnings forecasts, Easton’s (2004) model also requires positive 
change in earnings forecast.  The valuation equation is given by: 
 
(12) 𝑃! = !"#$!!!!!!"!"#!!!!!"#!!!!!"!  
Easton (2004:80) 
 
where 𝐷𝑃𝑆!!! = 𝐷𝑃𝑆!. 
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Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for implied equity premium estimates. 
The table demonstrates the implied cost of equity premium estimations distribution statistics and Pear-
son’s correlation coefficients for the 4085 companies during 2002-2013. Mean, first quartile, median, 
third quartile, and standard deviation are presented in the Panel A, while Panel B shows the Pearson pair-
wise correlations. rAVG is the average implied cost of equity premium, and it is calculated as average of 
four models produced by Claus & Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (20 
05), and Easton (2004) (rCT, rGLS, rOJ, and rES respectively). 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the implied cost of 
equity premium. In Panel A. the equity premium estimates are first presented based on 
the four models, and secondly the average implied cost of equity premium is presented 
by observation years. Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Easton (2004) models produce higher 
average equity premiums (6,34% and 6,77% respectively) compared to Claus & Thom-
as (2001) and Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005) models (3,06% and 4,20% respective-
ly). The Pearson correlation coefficients between the cost of equity estimates yielded 
from the four different models and the final averaged measure of the cost of equity capi-
tal (rAVG) are presented in the Panel B. The results are similar with Dhaliwal et al. 
(2011) and El Ghoul et al. (2011) findings showing rOJ and rES have higher correlations 
with rAVG, while rCT and rGLS exhibit lower correlation with rAVG. In addition, the im-
plied cost of equity premium peeks during years 2007, 2011, and 2012. 
 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 St.dev.
rCT 3,06 1,42 2,68 4,26 2,68
rGLS 6,34 4,05 6,00 8,22 3,39
rOJ 4,20 2,14 3,67 5,46 3,26
rES 6,77 4,38 6,05 8,22 3,96
rAVG 5,07 3,30 4,65 6,30 2,63
2002 4,76 3,21 4,27 5,73 2,51
2003 3,87 2,59 3,64 4,67 2,05
2004 3,55 2,40 3,21 4,41 1,92
2005 3,64 2,49 3,30 4,21 2,12
2006 3,36 2,27 3,05 3,82 2,01
2007 4,10 2,98 3,88 4,88 1,82
2008 7,65 5,55 6,95 8,81 3,21
2009 5,09 3,66 4,63 6,09 2,25
2010 5,25 4,01 5,03 6,27 2,02
2011 7,08 5,39 6,72 8,24 2,55
2012 6,63 5,33 6,32 7,38 2,18
2013 4,66 3,65 4,42 5,46 1,74
rCT rGLS rOJ rES
rGLS 0,563
rOJ 0,314 0,465
rES 0,344 0,451 0,724
rAVG 0,682 0,786 0,812 0,834
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for implied equity premium estimates.
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3.2.2. Corporate social responsibility 
 
To specify the proxy for CSR this study uses corporate governance, environmental, 
economic and social variables provided by Datastream. The variables are divided into 
two major categories: qualitative issue areas and controversial business issues. The 
qualitative issue areas include companies CSR activities, while controversial business 
issues category preserve the “sin” stocks. 
 
Qualitative issue areas cover corporate governance, emission reduction, resource reduc-
tion, community, human rights, diversity and opportunity, and employee issues charac-
teristics. All these seven issue areas include different sub-variables (illustrated in the 
Appendix 1). Datastream provides either “YES” or “NO” value for each of the CSR 
variable. “YES” means that the company practices the specific CSR policy, while “NO” 
means that the company has not applied the specific CSR practices. Based on these a 
binary (0/1) score is given for each qualitative issue areas from deducting the amount of 
cells containing “NO” from the amount of cells containing “YES”. If a company has 
applied more CSR practices than it has lacks in the variables, company will get the val-
ue of 1 for that specific issue area. Vice versa, if the company fails to apply any CSR 
practices or the amount of “YES” and “NO” are equal, the value of 0 will be assigned 
for the issue area. Furthermore, an ultimate CSR score is calculated by adding the sub-
variable scores together.  
 
Controversial business issues include alcohol, gambling, tobacco, armaments and nucle-
ar. Since qualitative issue areas and controversial business issues are critically different, 
they are examined separately. Consistent with the calculation process of CSR score, the 
involvement in controversial business issues is calculated with a variable that takes the 
value of 0/1 if a company is involved in any of the five controversial business areas 
(CSR_CONTR). Thus, a dummy value (1) is denoted for companies that are involved in 
any of the controversial business areas. Controversial business issues are listed in the 
Appendix 2.  
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
 
The implied cost of equity premium is regressed on also other variables than CSR to 
examine firm-specific effects. Factors that are shown to have an impact on the cost of 
equity capital are selected for control variables for multivariate analysis. Prior studies 
(e.g. Gebhardt et al., 2001; Hail & Leuz, 2006; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 
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2011) show that beta (BETA); size (SIZE), measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets; the book-to-market ratio (BTM); and leverage (LEV), computed as the ratio of 
total debt to the market value of equity, affect the cost of equity capital, and are there-
fore controlled in this study. Since the implied cost of equity capital is used as a de-
pendent variable, also analyst forecast attributes are controlled. Forecast dispersion 
(DISP), measured as the coefficient of variation of 1-year-ahead earnings forecasts, and 
the consensus long-term growth forecast (LTG) are used to control the analyst forecast 
features. Lastly, the industry effects are controlled by using Fama & French (1997) 48-
industry groups classification.  
 
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the CSR variables. The overall CSR score 
over the study period is stated in panel A. The maximum variation of the score is from 0 
to 7. The descriptive statistics show that the median increases over time, which means 
that companies’ awareness towards CSR practices has increased steadily over time. 
Even though the amount of companies applying CSR practices increases in the sample 
data, the amount of companies with lower CSR score exceed the companies that have 
high CSR scores during all years except years 2012 and 2013. This can be seen from the 
median that remains below the middle level of minimum and maximum value, and from 
all years’ average value 2,63.  
 
Panel B reports the frequency distribution of the controversial business issues. The per-
centage of companies involved in controversial businesses is expressed with 
CSR_CONTR(%) both at the year level and for the whole sample period. The percent-
ages for all five controversial business industries with respect to total sample size are 
presented in the panel B. The overall percentage for controversial business issues is 
14,10%, and from the percentages over the whole sample period, it can be clearly ob-
served that the fields of nuclear and armament dominate the controversial business is-
sues. The frequency distribution suggests that the involvement in the five controversial 
business issues has remained almost the same during the whole sample period. The 
amount of companies involved in alcohol and tobacco products has decreased during the 
sample period. However, the companies involved in armament products have more than 
doubled during the period and thus the decreasing impact is deleted. The involvement in 
gambling and nuclear has remained somewhat same during the sample period. 
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Table 3.  
Descriptive statistics for corporate social responsibility data. 
This table shows descriptive statistics of the CSR data for the 404 firms in the sample. Mean, minimum, 
first quartile, median, third quartile, maximum, and standard deviation of the overall CSR score are pro-
vided in the Panel A. The yearly frequency distribution of the controversial business issues is presented in 
panel B. Appendix 1 and 2 provide further details of the construction of the CSR variables. 
 
The other explanatory variables (Panel A) and the pair-wise correlations (Panel B) be-
tween the implied cost of equity estimates and the regression variables are presented in 
Table 4. The Pearson correlation coefficient shows that CSR score is actually associated 
with higher implied cost of equity premium. Contradictory to the hypotheses, the Pear-
son correlation coefficient indicates that market prices companies that have adopted 
CSR practices riskier than companies with low CSR score.  
 
In addition, beta, book-to-market ratio, size and leverage seem to have significant in-
creasing effect on cost of equity capital. Beta measures the systematic risk of a security, 
while leverage represents the amount of debt used to finance company’s assets. There-
fore, it is consistent that market sees companies with higher beta coefficients and lever-
age ratios riskier and requires higher cost of equity capital from them. Above one book-
to-market ratio indicates that the stock is undervalued, and it seems that companies with 
higher book value related to the market value also have higher cost of equity capital 
costs. Moreover, it seems that the company size impacts increasingly to the cost of equi-
ty capital. The only control variable that seems to have decreasing impact to cost of eq-
Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max St.dev.
2002 0,48 0 0 0 1 4 0,78
2003 0,82 0 0 1 1 5 0,84
2004 0,85 0 0 1 1 5 0,82
2005 1,06 0 0 1 1 7 0,99
2006 1,41 0 1 1 2 7 1,13
2007 2,28 0 1 2 3 7 1,39
2008 2,91 0 2 3 4 7 1,59
2009 3,17 0 2 3 4 7 1,73
2010 3,37 1 2 3 5 7 1,70
2011 3,63 1 2 3 5 7 1,74
2012 3,80 1 2 4 5 7 1,73
2013 3,84 1 2 4 5 7 1,76
All years 2,63 0 1 2 4 7 1,86
Year CSR_CONTR(%) CSR_ALC(%) CSR_GAM(%) CSR_TOB(%) CSR_ARM(%) CSR_NUC(%)
2002 14,50 2,30 0,50 0,90 3,60 7,70
2003 13,60 2,30 - 0,90 3,60 7,30
2004 9,90 1,40 - 0,40 2,80 6,00
2005 11,20 1,50 - 0,60 3,30 6,70
2006 13,70 0,90 1,20 0,30 5,10 7,20
2007 14,20 0,80 0,80 0,60 5,90 7,80
2008 15,20 0,80 1,00 0,30 7,10 7,60
2009 14,90 0,80 1,00 0,30 7,20 7,50
2010 15,20 0,80 1,00 0,30 7,30 7,60
2011 15,20 0,70 1,00 0,20 7,50 8,00
2012 14,60 0,70 1,00 0,20 7,40 7,40
2013 14,60 0,80 0,50 0,30 7,90 7,60
All years 14,10 1,10 0,70 0,40 6,00 7,40
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for the corporaate social responsibility score
Panel B. Frequency distribution for controversial business areas
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uity capital is long-term growth. Therefore it seems that markets require lower cost of 
equity capital from companies with expected growth in the future.  
 
Table 4. 
Descriptice data for regression variables. 
The descriptive statistics for the regression variables for the 4045 firm-year observations during sample 
period 2002-2013 is presented in this table. The mean, minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile, 
maximum, and standard deviation for the control variables are demonstrated in the Panel A., while Panel 
B. shows the Pearson pair-wise correlations between the regression variables and implied cost of equity 
premium obtained from four models developed by Claus & Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Ohl-
son & Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and Easton (2004).  
* Statistical significance at the 10%. 
** Statistical significance at the 5%. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1%. 
 
 
3.4. Methods 
 
The empirical part of this study follows El Ghoul et al. (2011) study and uses pooled 
time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) regression, which allows the data be organized under 
the dimension of space and dimension of time. The dependent variable is set to be the 
average implied cost of equity premium (rAVG) that is calculated from the four models 
developed by Claus & Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Ohlson & Juettner-
Nauroth (2005), and Easton (2004).  
 
The cost of equity premium is regressed on various CSR proxies and control variables, 
and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The regressions used in this study 
are executed with STATA. The regressions are run with xtreg command, and the result-
ing standard errors are completely robust to any kind of serial correlation and/or hete-
roskedasticity.   
 
Variable Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max St.dev.
Panel	A.	Descriptive	statistics	for	control	variables
BETA 			1,01 	-0,23 		0,71 		0,98 		1,31 		3,89 0,51
SIZE 16,41 	12,12 15,39 16,32 17,26 21,61 1,35
BTM 	0,45 			0,00 		0,24 		0,37 		0,58 		4,64 0,31
LEV 	0,38 			0,00 		0,08 		0,19 		0,47 	11,22 0,63
LTG 11,82 -41,00 		8,50 11,44 14,45 	75,99 6,64
DISP 	0,03 		-0,30 		0,01 		0,01 		0,03 			9,00 0,19
rAVG CSR_S BETA SIZE BTM LEV LTG
Panel	B.	Pearson	correlation	coefficients	between	regresson	variables
CSR_S 	0,27***
BETA 	0,19*** -0,03
SIZE 	0,22*** 								0,38*** -0,02
BTM 	0,51*** 								0,08*** 								0,05*** 			0,40***
LEV 	0,24*** 													0,06*** 							-0,04*** 			0,39*** 			0,41***
LTG -0,09*** 								-0,24*** 								0,22*** 		-0,30*** -0,24*** -0,18***
DISP 	0,11*** 												-0,02 						0,04** 									-0,01 		0,06*** 		0,05*** 0,05***
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Equation 13 explains the basic methodology used in this study.  𝑦!" and 𝑥!" are respec-
tively the dependent and independent variables for unit I and time t, while 𝜀!" is a ran-
dom error. 𝛽! is the constant intercept and 𝛽! represent the coefficient of an independ-
ent variable. In addition, 𝑢! represents the individual-level fixed effects or in this case 
the industry effects.  
 
(13) 𝑦!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝑢! + 𝜀!" 
 
Linear regression assumptions define whether to use random effects or fixed effects 
model. The assumptions for random effects model are significantly stricter than the as-
sumptions for fixed effects model. To test which model can be used in this study, 
Hausman and the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange- multiplier tests are run. Hausman test 
results show that Chi2 is significant, which indicates that fixed effects model should be 
used rather than random effect model. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange -multiplier test 
shows consistent results. The primary assumptions of random effects are violated, since 
Var(v) does not add to zero. Due to the fact that both of the tests reject null hypothesis, 
the fixed effect model is adopted to run the tests. 
 
The basic regression used in this study is the Equation 14, where the cost of equity pre-
mium (rAVG) is regressed on CSR score (CSR_S) and year and industry effects are con-
trolled. Equation 15 represents the regressions where the firm-specific variables are con-
trolled. 
 
(14)  𝑟!"# = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑆𝑅_𝑆!" + 𝑢! + 𝜀!" 
 
(15) 𝐸𝑄𝑅 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑆𝑅!!" + 𝛽!𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝐵𝑇𝑀!" + 𝛽!𝐿𝐸𝑉!" + 
 𝛽!𝐿𝑇𝐺!" + 𝛽!𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃!" + 𝑢! + 𝜀!" 
 
To control the year change effects the sample period is divided into three-year periods, 
but otherwise the regressions remain similar than demonstrated in equations X & Y. In 
addition, individual CSR components’ effect on the cost of equity capital is examined in 
this study. To control for individual CSR attributes, the cost of equity premium (rAVG) is 
regressed on individual CSR variable, and CSR score (CSR_S) is dropped from the re-
gression.  
 
Since the controversial issue areas are analyzed separately from qualitative issue areas, 
the CSR score (CSR_S) is replaced by controversial issue dummy (CSR_CONTR) in the 
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regressions examining controversial issue areas’ impact on the cost of equity capital. In 
regressions for individual controversial business areas controversial issue dummy 
(CSR_CONTR) is replaced with individual controversial attribute. The results are pre-
sented in the next Chapter 4. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
As discussed in the literature review the recent literature provides controversial results 
about how exactly CSR affects to firm valuation. This chapter reviews the results ob-
tained from the models used to investigate the relation between CSR and cost of equity 
capital. The chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, univariate tests are implemented in 
sub-chapter 4.1 to compare the cost of equity premium of firms with an above median 
CSR score against companies with below median CSR score. Secondly, multivariate 
regression analysis is executed in sub-chapter 4.2, and the cost of equity capital is re-
gressed on a number of CSR proxies and control variables. Lastly, the robustness 
checks are reported in sub-chapter 4.3. 
 
 
 Univariate analysis 4.1.
 
The univariate analysis in conducted by comparing the mean (Table 5, Panel A) and 
median (Table 5, Panel B) cost of equity premiums between companies that have above 
median CSR score to companies with below median CSR score. The comparison is 
made with using the average cost of equity premium (rAVG) and all four individual cost 
of equity estimates (rCT, rGLS, rOJ, and rES).  
 
The results comparing the average cost of equity premium show that the mean (median) 
cost of equity premium for companies with a high CSR score is 5,68% (5,22%), while 
companies with lower CSR score it is 4,10% (3,65%). Thus, the univariate test results 
support the preliminary results obtained from the Pearson correlation coefficient test 
that companies with lower CSR score actually benefit from 1,58 (1,57) basis points 
lower cost of equity premium and therefore lower financing costs. The T-test (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test) is used to calculate the significance of the differences between the 
means, and all these differences are significant at the 1% level. Equally, the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test is used to test the significance of the differences between the median 
scores. Also all these differences are significant at the 1% level.  
 
The differences between mean and median scores are calculated also by using the four 
individual cost of equity premiums. Even if the individual estimates are used to examine 
the direction of the differences, it seems that companies with higher CSR score have 
also greater cost of equity costs. Thus, the univariate analysis suggests that adopting 
48 
 
CSR practices actually increases companies’ cost of equity premium rather than de-
creases it. 
 
Table 5. 
Univariate test. 
The table shows the results of mean (Panel A) and median (Panel B) comparison tests for individual and 
average cost of equity estimates. The test is made by comparing companies with high (above median) and 
low (below median) CSR score (CSR_S). The sample contains 4085 observations during the sample peri-
od 2002-2013. rCT, rGLS, rOJ, and rES are implied cost of equity estimates obtained from the models devel-
oped by Claus & Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and Easton 
(2004) respectively. rAVG is the average cost of equity premium determined from the previously listed four 
models. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 Multivariate regression analysis 4.2.
 
Multivariate regression analysis is used to further examine the CSR’s impact on cost of 
equity capital, and the averaged implied cost of equity premium (rAVG) is regressed on 
various CSR proxies and control variables. The multivariate analysis is conducted by 
using pooled time-series cross-sectional regression (TSCS), which is a powerful explan-
atory tool organizing the data under the dimension of space and dimension of time. The 
results are presented in Table 6. In all models, the average cost of equity premium is the 
dependent variable, while explanatory variables include, in addition to different CSR 
proxies, many firm-specific control variables and also year and industry fixed effects. 
 
In Models 1 – 6 the overall CSR score’s (CSR_S) impact on the cost of equity capital is 
tested, while controlling both year and industry effects. Model 1 is the basic regression 
and only the effect of CSR is scrutinized with year and industry effects. The control var-
iables (BETA, SIZE, BTM, LEV, LTG, DISP) are included in Model 2 to allow examina-
tion of different firm-specific controls’ impact on the cost of equity capital. The results 
from both Model 1 and Model 2 are similar, and the impact of CSR on the cost of equity 
is neutral. However, it seems that leverage (LEV) and dispersion (DISP) have significant 
and increasing effect on the cost of equity capital. 
N rCT rGLS rOJ rES rAVG
Panel	A.	Means
CSR_S	≥	median (1) 2513 3,63 7,19 4,70 7,41 5,68
CSR_S	<	median (2) 1572 2,16 4,99 3,40 5,75 4,10
Difference (1)-(2) 1,47 2,20 1,30 1,66 1,58
t-stat. 			-22,99*** 			-28,72*** 			-17,87*** 			-19,66*** 		-27,82***
Panel	B.	Medians
CSR_S	≥	median (1) 2513 3,19 6,82 4,16 6,72 5,22
CSR_S	<	median (2) 1572 1,87 4,56 2,75 5,09 3,65
Difference (1)-(2) 1,32 2,26 1,41 1,63 1,57
Z-stat. 		-19,14*** 		-23,38*** 			-15,27*** 			-15,76*** 			-20,72***
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To examine the changes in the relation between CSR and the cost of equity capital the 
sample is divided into four sub-periods: 2002-2004 (Model 3), 2005-2007 (Model 4), 
2008-2010 (Model 5), and 2011-2013 (Model 6). As seen from Table 1, the amount of 
companies that have adopted CSR practices has increased over the time. Therefore, the 
relation between CSR and the cost of equity capital is expected to change over time. 
Only during financial crises period 2008-2010 in Model 5 the impact of CSR on the cost 
of equity capital is significant and positive. However, the impact is insignificant.  
 
Finally, in Models 8 – 13 the examination of the relation between CSR and the cost of 
equity capital is extended to cover the individual CSR proxies’ effect on the cost of eq-
uity capital. The impact of corporate governance (CSR_GOV_S), emission reduction 
(CSR_EMI_S), resource reduction (CSR_RES_S), community (CSR_COM_S), human 
rights (CSR_HUM_S), employee relations (CSR_EMP_S),  and diversity and oppor-
tunity (CSR_DIV_S) on the cost of equity capital is individually investigated. Similarly 
to CSR score a yearly binary score (1/0) is calculated for all individual CSR attributes 
depending whether companies have adopted the specific CSR practices (1) or not (0). 
The objective of examining the specific CSR practices’ effect on the cost of equity capi-
tal is to find out whether certain attributes have greater impact on the cost of equity cap-
ital than others.  
 
Model 7 tests the impact of corporate governance on the cost of equity capital. The co-
efficient for CSR_GOV_S is only negative coefficient in Models 7 – 13. However, the 
result is insignificant. The impact of emission reduction tested in Model 8 is neutral and 
insignificant. Resource reduction (Model 9), community (Model 10), human rights 
(Model 11), employee relations (12) and diversity and opportunity (Model 13) seem to 
have slight but significant impact on the cost of equity capital. All these attributes have 
increasing impact on the cost of equity capital, which indicates that companies that have 
adopted these any of these five CSR practices suffer from higher cost of equity capital.  
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Table 6. 
Corporate social responsibility and the cost of equity capital. 
The results from regressing the average cost of equity premium (rAVG) on CSR scores and control varia-
bles over the sample period 2002-2013 are presented in this table. rAVG is the cost of equity estimate ob-
tained from the models developed by Claus & Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Ohlson & Juettner-
Nauroth (2005), and Easton (2004). In Models 1 and 2 the overall CSR score is used to examine CSR’s 
impact on the cost of equity capital. Models 3 – 6 replicate the Model 2 dividing the total sample period 
into sub-periods. Models 7 – 13 examine individual CSR component’s effect on the cost of equity capital. 
The individual components examined are: corporate governance (CSR_GOV_S), emission reduction 
(CSR_EMI_S), resource reduction (CSR_RES_S), community (CSR_COM_S), human rights 
(CSR_HUM_S), employee relations (CSR_EMP_S), and diversity and opportunity (CSR_DIV_S). T-
statistics are listed inside the parentheses.  
* Statistical significance at the 10%. 
** Statistical significance at the 5%.  
*** Statistical significance at the 1%. 
 
Riskiness, size, book-to-market, and leverage are included in all regressions in Table 6 
(excluding Model 1) to examine the impact of firm-specific characteristics on the cost 
of equity capital. The results show that during the sample period company’s riskiness 
(BETA) and book-to-market (BTM) have positive and significant effects on the cost of 
equity capital, though the impact remains relatively small. Similarly to Dhaliwal et al. 
(2011) and El Ghoul et al. (2011) findings the impact of company leverage (LEV) has 
generally positive and significant coefficient (except in Model 4 where leverage is in-
significant) indicating that the debt-asset ratio has significant impact on company’s cost 
of equity capital and financing costs. Also the forecast variables forecast dispersion 
(DISP) and long-term growth forecast (LTG) seem to have positive and significant im-
pacts on the cost of equity capital. Forecast dispersion’s impact on the cost of equity 
capital increases significantly during pre-financial crises period (Model 4) and during 
financial crises period (Model 5) diminishing after the crisis period (Model 6). In addi-
tion, long-term growth (LTG) increases the cost of equity capital in Models 2 – 6 except 
during the financial crises period (Model 5) when long-term growth seems to have a de-
creasing impact on the company’s cost of equity capital. The impact is low but signifi-
CSR_S                                                                                 CSR_S             2002-
2004          
2005-     
2007
2008-
2010 
2011-    
2013
CSR_GOV_S CSR_EMI_S CSR_RES_S CSR_COM_S CSR_HUM_S CSR_EMP_S CSR_DIV_S 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
CSR
0.001*** 
(4.21)
0.001*** 
(2,74)
0.00     
(0.51)
0.000   
(0.78)
0,001*** 
(2,83)
-0.000           
(-0.21)
-0.001            
(0.83)
0.000    
(0.72)
0.003*** 
(3.32) 0.001* (1.88)
0.004** 
(2.43)
0.003*** 
(4.18)
0.008*** 
(9.88)
BETA
0.003*** 
(4.68)
0.000             
(-0.00)
0.000   
(0.04)
0,006*** 
(4.58)
0.004*** 
(3.68)
0.003*** 
(4.73)
0.003*** 
(4.73)
0.003*** 
(4.60)
0.003*** 
(4.60)
0.003*** 
(4.66)
0.003*** 
(4.83)
0.003*** 
(3.95)
SIZE
0.001* 
(1.82)
0.000   
(0.03)
0.001** 
(1.98)
0.000   
(0.26)
0.001** 
(2.24)
0.001*** 
(3.71)
0.001*** 
(31.46)
0.001** 
(2.37)
0.001*** 
(2.88)
0.001*** 
(3.09)
0.001** 
(2.25)
-0.000           
(-0.32)
BTM
0.037*** 
(31.59)
0.038*** 
(12.82)
0.040*** 
(15.71)
0.035*** 
(15.88)
0.034*** 
(15.67)
0.036*** 
(31.43)
0.036*** 
(31.46)
0.037*** 
(31.69)
0.036*** 
(31.54)
0.036*** 
(31.57)
0.037*** 
(31.81)
0.043*** 
(32.94)
LEV
 0.458*** 
(8.27)
0.480*** 
(3.58)
0.042   
(0.36)
0.410*** 
(4.49)
0.604*** 
(5.32)
0.004*** 
(8.11)
0.005*** 
(8.14)
0.005*** 
(8.25)
0.005*** 
(8.16)
0.005*** 
(8.19)
0.005*** 
(8.33)
0.006*** 
(8.55)
LTG
 0.012** 
(2.47)
0.007   
(0.57)
0.035*** 
(3.53)
-0.028***    
(-2.98)
0.024*** 
(3.09)
0.000*** 
(2.21)
0.000** 
(2.26)
0.000** 
(2.48)
0.000** 
(2.29)
0.000** 
(2.24)
0.000** 
(2.56)
-0.000           
(-1.47)
DISP
0.852**    
(5.68)
0.946*** 
(4.07)
4.455*** 
(2.91)
5.087*** 
(8.14)
0.579** 
(2.49)
0.009*** 
(5.67)
0.009*** 
(5.67)
0.009*** 
(5.60)
0.009*** 
(5.70)
0.009*** 
(5.68)
0.009*** 
(5.71)
0.009*** 
(4.91)
INTERCEPT 0.048*** 
(12.56)
0.025***     
(4.24)
0.0342*** 
(2.89)
0,002   
(0.19)
0.054***     
(-14.06)
0.036*** 
(3.16)
0.019*** 
(3.43)
0.020*** 
(3.58)
0.024*** 
(4.13)
0.022*** 
(3.86)
0.022*** 
(3.86)
0.024*** 
(4.22)
0.042*** 
(6.26)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4084 4083 723 1023 1165 1174 4083 4083 4083 4038 4038 4083 4083
Adj. R2 0.3906 0.5717 0.4954 0.4055 0.5605 0.4952 0.5646 0.5646 0.5657 0.5649 0.551 0.5728 0.4073
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cant. Also, when the individual CSR components are used in the regression (Models 7 – 
13) the impact of long-term growth forecast is neutral. 
 
Next the impact of involvement in controversial business issues on the cost of equity 
capital is scrutinized. It is usually emphasized that companies operating with “sin” in-
dustries (e.g. alcohol, tobacco, and nuclear) are seen riskier and therefore have higher 
expected returns (e.g. El Ghoul et al., 2011). The effects of five controversial business 
areas, namely, alcohol, gambling, tobacco, armaments, and nuclear, are analyzed in the 
Table 7. In addition, the overall controversial dummy variable CSR score 
(CSR_CONTR) is assigned for companies involved in any of the five controversial 
business industries. 
 
The overall impact of controversial business areas is investigated in Model 1. The re-
sults show that markets see the involvement in controversial business issues as a posi-
tive sign and the coefficient estimate on CSR_CONTR is actually negative and signifi-
cant. In Models 2 – 6 the impacts of individual controversial business areas on the cost 
of equity capital are examined. The results show that all controversial business coeffi-
cients are negative except alcohol (CSR_ALC). However, the statistical significance var-
ies across the variables. As mentioned, the impact of alcohol (Model 2) on the cost of 
equity capital is the only positive coefficient, but the impact is statistically insignificant.  
The impacts of gambling and tobacco are examined in Models 3 and 4 respectively, and 
the results show that both gambling and tobacco have negative but insignificant effects 
on the cost of equity capital. The coefficients for armaments and nuclear are negative 
and significant, which indicates that companies that are involved in these two industries 
benefit from lower cost of equity capital. However, the coefficients of all of the contro-
versial business areas are relatively low. 
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Table 7. 
Controversial business areas and the cost of equity capital. 
The results from regressing the cost of equity premium (rAVG) on indicators for controversial business 
areas and control variables during the sample period 2002-2013 are presented in this table. rAVG is the cost 
of equity estimate obtained from the models developed by Claus & Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. 
(2001), Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and Easton (2004). The controversial business areas are alco-
hol (CSR_ALC in Model 2), gambling (CSR_GAM in Model 3), tobacco (CSR_TOB in Model 4), arma-
ments (CSR_ARM in Model 5), and nuclear (CSR_NUC in Model 6). In Model 1 dummy variable 
CSR_CONTR that takes a value of 1 for companies involved in any of the five controversial business are-
as. The definitions for controversial business areas are listed in Appendix 2 and unreported industry con-
trols are based on Fama & French (1997) industry classifications. T-statistics are listed inside the paren-
theses. 
* Statistical significance at the 10%. 
** Statistical significance at the 5%. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1%. 
 
Finally, the CSR’s impact on the cost of equity capital is examined during the pre-crisis 
period crisis period (2002-2006), during crisis period (2007-2009), and post-crisis peri-
od (2010-2013). The crisis period is adjusted to include years 2007, 2008, and 2009, 
since during these years the markets were most volatile. Table 8 reports the results from 
regressing the cost of equity premium (rAVG) on CSR_S during the pre-crisis period cri-
sis period (2002-2006), during crisis period (2007-2009), and post-crisis period (2010-
2013).  Table 9 presents the results from regressing the cost of equity premium on indi-
vidual CSR components during the pre-crisis period crisis period (2002-2006), during 
crisis period (2007-2009), and post-crisis period (2010-2013), and Table 10 shows the 
results from regressing the cost of equity on individual controversial business areas dur-
ing the pre-crisis period crisis period (2002-2006), during crisis period (2007-2009), and 
post-crisis period (2010-2013). 
 
CSR_CONTR                                                                                CSR_ALC       CSR_GAM CSR_TOB CSR_ARM CSR_NUC 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSR
-0.004***                              
(-3.92)
0.009                              
(1.54)
-0.003                                    
(-0.99)
-0.007                                    
(-0.83)
-0.007***                              
(-4.99)
-0.005***                              
(-3.99)
BETA
0.003***                       
(4.37)
0.003***                       
(4.77)
0.003***                      
(4.76)
0.003***                       
(4.74)
0.003***                       
(4.22)
0.003***                        
(4.43)
SIZE
0.001***                       
(4.04)
0.001***                      
(3.58)
0.001***                       
(3.61)
0.001***                      
(3.63)
0.001***                       
(4.02)
0.001***                         
(4.03)
BTM
0.036***                    
(31.52)
0.036***                    
(31.47)
0.036***                    
(31.46)
0.036***                    
(31.47)
0.036***                      
(31.27)
0.036***                        
(31.56)
LEV
0.004***                      
(8.14)
0.004***                      
(8.13)
0.005***                      
(8.15)
0.004***                       
(8.10)
0.005***                      
(8.41)
0.004***                       
(7.97)
LTG
0.000**                        
(2.13)
0.000**                         
(2.21)
0.000**                        
(2.21)
0.000**                         
(2.21)
0.000**                         
(2.29)
0.000**                         
(2.03)
DISP
0.008***                       
(5.62)
0.009***                       
(5.70)
0.009***                      
(5.69)
0.009***                       
(5.70)
0.008***                      
(5.62)
0.008***                      
(5.64)
INTERCEPT
0.022***                      
(3.89)
0.20***                        
(3.52)
0.020***                      
(3.50)
0.20***                        
(3.50)
0.025***                       
(4.39)
0.20***                         
(3.50)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4083 4083 4083 4083 4083 4083
Adj. R2 0.5662 0.5648 0.5646 0.5646 0.5672 0.5662
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 In Table 8, in Models 1 – 3 the average cost of equity premium (rAVG) is regressed to 
CSR score (CSR_S), while in Models 5 – 8 the controversial dummy score 
(CSR_CONTR) is the regression variable. Model 1 presents the CSR’s effect on the cost 
of equity capital before the financial crisis. The impact is negative but low and statisti-
cally insignificant. However, during the financial crisis (Model 2), and during post-
crisis period CSR seems to have positive effect on the cost of equity capital. This find-
ing indicates that CSR has not decreased the financing costs during more uncertain 
times and the results remain constant with earlier findings in Table 6.  
 
Models 4 – 6 follow same logic than Models 1 – 3 but the CSR score (CSR_S) is re-
placed with controversial dummy variable (CSR_CONTR) to examine whether the effect 
of involvement in controversial business areas have changed during the pre-crisis perios 
(2002-2006), crisis period (2007-2009), and post-crisis period (2010-2013). The results 
are similar for all periods, and it seems that companies that are involved in controversial 
business issues benefit from lower financing cost during every sub-period.  
 
Table 8. 
Corporate social responsibility, controversial business areas and the cost of equity capital during financial 
crisis. 
 
This table reports the results from regressing the cost of equity premium (rAVG) on CSR/controversial 
business areas dummy variable and control variables during the pre-crisis period 2002-2006, crisis period 
2007-2009 and past-crisis period 2010-2013. Model 1, 2, and 3 use the overall CSR score (CSR_S) and 
the time periods are set to 2002-2006, 2007-2009, and 2010-2013 respectively. Models 3, 4, and 5 use the 
controversial business areas dummy variable (CSR_CONTR) and the time periods are set to 2002-2006, 
2007-2009, and 2010-2013 respectively. The t-statistics are reported inside the parantheses. 
* Statistical significance at the 10%. 
** Statistical significance at the 5%. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1%. 
CSR_S                                                                                 CSR_S CSR_S CSR_CONTR_S CSR_CONTR_S CSR_CONTR_S 
2002-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 2002-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSR -0.000                      
(-0.01) 
0.001***        
(2.86)
0,001***        
(2,83)
-0.003*                       
(-1.80)
-0.004**                   
(-2.04)
-0.003**                
(-2.00)
BETA 0.000             
(0.06)
0.005***         
(3.40)
0,006***        
(4.58)
-0.000                       
(-0.14) 
0.004***             
(3.32)
0.004***       
(4.04)
SIZE 0.001**           
(2.11)
-0.001                      
(-1.27)
0.000                  
(0.26)
0.001***       
(2.57)
0.000            
(0.63)
0.002***         
(4.12)
BTM 0.038***    
(17.75)
0.37***         
(16.69)
0.035***    
(15.88)
0.038***     
(17.85)
0.036***    
(16.49)
0.034***         
(16.61)
LEV 0.003***        
(2.72)
0.003***           
(3.86)
0.410***              
(4.49)
0.003***           
(2.70)
0.003***            
(3.58)
0.006***             
(6.07)
LTG 0.000                 
(3.72)
-0.000***                
(-3.39)
-0.028***                 
(-2.98)
0.000***           
(3.77)
-0.000***               
(-3.66)
0.000***           
(2.79)
DISP 0.009***          
(3.89)
0.055***            
(8.68)
5.087***            
(8.14)
0.009***       
(3.84)
0.055***        
(8.65)
0.005**        
(2.30)
INTERCEPT 0.014                
(1.61)
0.045***         
(3.72)
0.054***                
(-14.06)
0.016*         
(81.85)
0.035***               
(3.07)
0.015*                 
(1.66)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects No No Yes No Yes Yes
N 1388 1128 1165 1388 1128 1567
Adj. R2 0,4591 0,5864 0,5605 0,4605 0,5849 0,5237
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Next the individual CSR component’s effect is examined closer in Table 9. The results 
show that only diversity and opportunity (CSR_DIV_S) has had a negative and statisti-
cally significant effect on cost of equity capital during the post-crisis period (2010-
2013). During the financial crisis period (2007-2009) especially investments in emission 
reduction (CSR_EMI_S), resource reduction (CSR_RES_S), and employee issues 
(CSR_EMP_S) have increased companies financing costs through the cost of equity 
capital. Corporate governance (CSR_S_GOV) has negative effect on the cost of equity 
capital during pre-crisis period and crisis period but the effect is low and statistically 
insignificant. Also, at post-crisis period corporate governance increases the cost of equi-
ty capital by almost 3 percentage points and the effect is statistically significant.  
 
The impact of individual controversial business areas on the cost of equity capital is re-
viewed in Table 10. The results show that during crisis period markets have required 
lower cost of equity capital from companies involved in alcohol (CSR_ALC), arma-
ments (CSR_ARM) or nuclear (CSR_NUC) industry. However, involvement in alcohol 
business has increased companies’ cost of equity during the pre-crisis period, but after 
that the effect turns into negative and statistically significant during the financial crisis 
as well as during the past-crisis period. For armament industry the negative and statisti-
cally significant effect lingers during all three sub-periods, but the decreasing effect also 
diminishes during the time. The results from regressing nuclear on the cost of equity 
premium are similar to results obtained from armament industry. However, during the 
post-crisis period the effect is statistically insignificant even though it is negative. 
 
To summarize the main results from regressing the different CSR proxies and firm-
specific control variables on the cost equity variables there are three main findings. 
Firstly, CSR’s impact on the cost of equity capital seems to be neutral or slightly posi-
tive. Only efforts in diversity and opportunity have a negative effect on the cost of equi-
ty capital. Second, company’s involvement in controversial business areas appear to 
have decreasing effect on the cost of equity premium. This means that companies bene-
fit from controversial businesses rather than are required to have higher financing costs. 
Thirdly, the CSR’s and controversial business areas’ impact on the cost of equity capital 
varies across the CSR and controversial attributes suggesting that other 
CSR/controversial attributes have higher impact on the cost of equity capital than other. 
Specially alcohol, armaments, and nuclear seem to have lowered company’s cost of eq-
uity capital. 
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 Table 10. 
Individual controversial business areas and the cost of equity capital during financial. 
This table presents the results from regressing the cost of equity capital on individual controversial busi-
ness areas. The cost of equity capital is regressed on alcohol (CSR_ALC) in Models 1 – 3, on gaming 
(CSR_GAM) on Models 4 – 6, on tobacco (CSR_TOB) on Models 7 – 9, on armaments (CSR_ARM) on 
Models 10 – 13, and on nuclear (CSR_NUC) on Models 13 – 15. The t-statistics are reported inside the 
parantheses. 
* Statistical significance at the 10%. 
** Statistical significance at the 5%. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1%. 
 
 
 Robustness checks 4.3.
 
To test the accuracy of the results obtained from the univariate and multivariate analy-
sis, some sensitivity test are controlled. This study uses alternative models to test the 
robustness of the four models used to calculate the rAVG. Furthermore, the noise in ana-
lyst forecasts is being controlled.   
 
4.3.1. Alternative models for estimating cost of equity capital 
 
In this study, the dependent variable has been specified as the average cost of equity 
premium (rAVG) estimated with four different models to avoid biased results arising 
from the use of single model. However, the results are also tested with individual cost of 
equity premiums to test whether the rAVG is driven by some of the cost of equity premi-
ums. In Table 11 the regression from Model 2 in Table 6 is replicated, but instead of 
using the rAVG as a dependent variable the individual risk premiums, rCT, rGLS, rOJ, and 
rES, are used. The results remain similar, indicating that CSR has no impact on lowering 
or increasing cost of equity capital.  
CSR_ALC CSR_ALC CSR_ALC CSR_GAM CSR_GAM CSR_GAM CSR_TOB CSR_TOB CSR_TOB CSR_ARM CSR_ARM CSR_ARM CSR_NUC CSR_NUC CSR_NUC 
2002-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 2002-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 2002-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013 2002-2006 2007-2009 2010-2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
CSR 0.010*      
(1.89)
-0.017**       
(-1.99)
-0.030***    
(-4.42)
-0.010           
(-1.38)
-0.001          
(-0.15)
-0.004         
(-0.81)
-0.009            
(-0.99)
0.002       
(0.12)
-0.014         
(-1.47)
-0.010***      
(-3.66)
-0.007**         
(-2.51)
-0.004**       
(-1.98)
-0.004                    
(-1.62)
-0.005**         
(-1.96)
-0.005***     
(-2.69)
BETA 0.000       
(0.16)
0.005***      
(3.51)
0.004***    
(4.23)
0.000            
(0.07)
0.005***   
(3.51)
0.004***    
(4.25)
0.000      
(0.09)
0.005***   
(3.51)
0.004***     
(4.23)
-0.000              
(-0.27)
0.004***    
(3.16)
0.004***   
(4.01)
-0.000               
(-0.06)
0.005***   
(3.38)
0.004***   
(4.02)
SIZE 0.001**     
(2.26)
0.000       
(0.41)
0.002***    
(3.94)
0.001**      
(2.31)
0.000        
(0.41)
0.002***   
(3.94)
0.001**     
(2.36)
0.000     
(0.41)
0.002***   
(3.94)
0.001***    
(2.80)
0.000     
(0.63)
0.002***   
(4.03)
0.001**     
(2.49)
0.000       
(0.60)
0.002***   
(4.23)
BTM 0.038***   
(17.87)
0.036***   
(16.40)
0.034***   
(18.57)
0.039***   
(17.89)
0.036***   
(16.27)
0.034***    
(18.57)
0.038***     
(17.84)
0.036***    
(16.39)
0.034***   
(18.57)
0.038***      
(17.91)
0.036***    
(16.32)
0.34***   
(18.47)
0.038***   
(17.87)
0.036***   
(16.50)
0.034***   
(18.66)
LEV 0.003***   
(2.76)
0.003*** 
(3.57)
0.006***   
(6.05)
0.003***         
(2.74)
0.003***   
(3.57)
0.006***    
(6.07)
0.003***     
(2.70)
0.003***    
(3.57)
0.06***   
(6.05)
0.003***    
(2.83)
0.003***    
(3.76)
0.006***  
(6.17)
0.003***   
(2.71)
0.003***   
(3.45)
0.006***    
(5.91)
LTG 0.000*** 
(3.73)
-0.000***         
(-3.72)
0.000***   
(2.91)
0.000***     
(3.71)
-0.000***     
(-3.72)
0.000***  
(2.91)
0.000***    
(3.72)
-0.000***         
(-3.72)
0.000***  
(2.91)
0.000***   
(3.88)
-0.000***        
(-3.52)
0.000***    
(2.91)
0.000***  
(3.69)
-0.000***        
(-3.80)
0.000***   
(2.75)
DISP 0.009***   
(3.89)
0.056***   
(8.74)
0.005**   
(2.33)
0.009***    
(3.89)
0.022***   
(15.55)
0.005**    
(2.33)
0.000***     
(3.89)
0.056***    
(8.74)
0.005**    
(2.33)
0.009***    
(3.79)
0.055***    
(8.68)
0.005**    
(2.31)
0.009***    
(3.69)
0.055***   
(8.65)
0.005**    
(2.29)
INTERCEPT 0.015*    
(1.74)
0.032***   
(2.88)
0.013       
(1.45)
0.015*      
(1.71)
0.032***   
(2.88)
0.013     
(1.44)
0.014*    
(1.67)
0.032***   
(2.88)
0.013     
(1.45)
0.021**    
(2.39)
0.037***    
(3.28)
0.017*     
(1.81)
0.014*       
(1.68)
0.032***   
(2.89)
0.013   
(1.43)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes
N 1388 1128 1567 1388 1128 1567 1388 1128 1567 1388 1128 1567 1388 1128 1567
Adj. R2 0.4606 0.5837 0.5227 0.4599 0.5833 0.5226 0.4595 0.5833 0.5227 0.4645 0.5857 0.5236 0.4602 0.5848 0.5247
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In addition, three alternative models are used to calculate the cost of equity capital to 
mitigate the concerns that the four models used in this study are providing biased re-
sults. The following two PEG-ratios are special cases of Easton (2004) model and the 
models assume zero dividend payments. The first version  (model 5) of the model is 
based on short-term earnings forecasts, while the second model (model 6) is based on 
long-term earnings forecasts. The valuation equations are given by: 
 
 
(16) 𝑃! = !"#$!!!!!"#$!!!!!"#!!  
Easton (2004) 
 
(17) 𝑃! = !"#!!!!!!"#$!!!!!"#!!  
Easton (2004) 
The third alternative model (model 7) is obtained from simplified earnings-price ratio 
and it is a special case of Francis, Olsson & Schipper (2005) model assuming that there 
is no abnormal earnings growth. The EP ratio is given by: 
 
(18) 𝐸𝑃𝑅 = !"#$!!!!!  
Francis et al. (2005). 
 
Consistent with the individual cost of equity estimates, the results from using alternative 
cost of equity estimates show that CSR has no impact on cost of equity premium. How-
ever, the model 5 show that CSR affects decreasingly to short-term cost of equity capi-
tal. Yet, the result is both statistically and quantitatively insignificant.   
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Table 11. 
Corporate social responsibility and individual and alternative cost of equity capital estimates.  
The results from regression individual cost of equity models (Models 1 – 4) and alternative cost of equity 
estimates (Models 5 – 7) on the overall CSR score are presented in this table. The results cover the sam-
ple period 2002-2012). In Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 the cost of equity is estimated with models developed by 
Claus & Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005) respectively. Model 5 
uses the Price-Earnings-Growth (PEG) ratio that is based on 1- and 2- year-ahead earnings forecasts to 
estimate the implied risk premium, while Model 6 is estimated with PEG-ratio based on 4- and 5- year-
ahead earnings forecasts. Model 7 is earnings-to-price ratio. The t-statistics are reported inside the paran-
theses. 
* Statistical significance at the 10%. 
** Statistical significance at the 5%. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1%. 
 
4.3.2. Noise in analyst forecasts 
 
The noise in analyst forecasts is often associated with analysts’ sluggishness and their 
tendency to react slowly to available public information (e.g. Ali, Klein & Rosenfield, 
1992). To confront the possible slow reaction to public information the price momen-
tum computed as the compound stock returns over the past 3, 6, ad 12 months is includ-
ed in the regression as one regression variable. The additional explanatory variable that 
controls past stock returns will decrease the possibility that the analysts’ forecasts are 
sluggish with respect to information in past returns (e.g. Chen et al., 2009:288). The 
equation for compounded stock returns is given by: 
 
(19) 𝐶𝑅! = (!!!!!! ) !!"# − 1 
 
rCT rGLS rOJ rES rPEG2 rPEG5 EPR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CSR
0.001***                      
(3.54)
0.000                             
(0.40)
0001**                            
(2.07)
0.000                            
(1.01)
-0.001                                    
(-0.27)
0.001**                         
(2.32)
0.001***                        
(2.81)
BETA 0.006***                       
(7.10)
0.004***                        
(5.69)
0.002                              
(1.55)
0.002*                            
(1.94)
0.006***                        
(5.02)
0.013***                       
(6.35)
0.005***                        
(4.65)
SIZE 0.001***                      
(2.74)
0.001**                          
(2.25)
0.000                               
(0.06)
0.001                            
(1.53)
-0.000                                     
(-0.12)
-0.003***                           
(-3.51)
0.001***                        
(2.74)
BTM 0.008***                     
(5.09)
0.062***                      
(56.95)
0.027***                     
(14.88)
0.038***                       
(17.23)
0.034***                        
(17.03)
0.042***                      
(11.91)
0.045***                       
(26.78)
LEV 0.005***                      
(6.84)
0.005***                       
(8.79)
0.007***                       
(7.64)
0.004***                       
(3.57)
0.005***                        
(4.82)
0.012***                       
(7.34)
0.006***                        
(6.85)
LTG 0.000**                        
(2.11)
-0.000***                             
(-10.27)
0.000***                       
(3.39)
0.001***                       
(6.20)
0.001**                         
(11.17)
0.001***                        
(8.73)
-0,001***                              
(-19.40)
DISP -0.002                                    
(-1.30)
-0.002*                           
(-1.67)
0.015***                       
(6.63)
0.019***                        
(6.73)
0.022***                        
(8.39)
0.006                              
(1.40)
-0.017***                              
(-7.79)
INTERCEPT 0.006                              
(0.79)
0.006***                        
(9.47)
0.017*                             
(1.87)
0.016                           
(1.41)
0.018*                             
(1.73)
0.080***                        
(4.46)
0.005                               
(0.60)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects No Yes No No No No Yes
N 4083 4083 4083 4083 4083 4083 4083
Adj. R2 0.3172 0.7676 0.3254 0.2926 0.3364 0.2501 0.5897
Individual cost of equity estimates Alternative cost of equity estimates
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The robustness checks by using alternative models and compounded stock returns are 
presented in Table 12. The results show that the regression is robust for analyst forecast 
sluggishness, and the outcome  
 
Table 12. 
Robustness to analyst forecast sluggishness. 
This table presents the robustness results for Model 2 from Table 6 controlling analyst forecast sluggish-
ness. An additional variable is added to Models 1 – 3 to control for price momentum estimated as com-
pounded returns over the past 3, 6, and 12 months respectively. rAVG is the regression variable and it is the 
average implied cost of equity premium computed from four models developed by Claus & Thomas 
(2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), Ohlson & Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and Easton (2004). The t-statistics are 
reported inside the parantheses.  
* Statistical significance at the 10%. 
** Statistical significance at the 5%. 
*** Statistical significance at the 1%. 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
CSR_S 0.001**                                   
(2.40)
0.001**                                     
(2.43)
0.001**                                     
(2.47)
BETA 0.003***                                 
(4.91)
0.003***                                    
(4.97)
0.003***                                   
(5.03)
SIZE 0.001*                                      
(1.75)
0.001*                                       
(1.66)
0.000                                         
(1.59)
BTM 0.035***                                
(29.38)
0.035***                                 
(29.73)
0.036***                                 
(30.42)
LEV 0.004***                                  
(7.92)
0.004***                                   
(8.07)
0005***                                     
(8.26)
LTG 0.000***                                   
(3.84)
0.000***                                   
(3.72)
0.000***                                    
(3.45)
DISP 0.008***                                   
(5.59)
0.008***                                  
(5.60)
0.008***                               
(5.63)
MOM3 -0040***                                         
(-9.00)
MOM6 -0.017***                                         
(-8.03)
MOM12 -0.006***                                       
(-6.27)
INTERCEPT 0.024***                                    
(4.04)
0.24***                                        
(4.13)
0.025***                               
(4.23)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
N 4084 4083 4083
Adj. R2 0.5759 0.5742 0.5715
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper examines whether corporate social responsibility has an impact on compa-
nies’ ex ante cost of equity implied in stock prices and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Fur-
thermore, this study compares the CSR’s impact on the cost of equity capital during the 
financial crisis and non-crisis period. This study is conducted with a sample of 4085 US 
firm-year observations during sample period 2002-2013 while controlling firm-specific 
variables as well as industry and year fixed effects. Contradictory to the hypotheses, the 
results show that the overall CSR score of a company has no visible impact on the cost 
of equity capital, and companies’ with higher CSR involvement do not benefit from it 
during the financial crisis period. However, investments in diversity and opportunity 
have slightly lowered the company’s cost of equity capital.  
 
This study contributes to the debate on whether CSR’s impact on company valuation is 
increasing, decreasing or neutral. The findings show the market reactions to companies’ 
involvement in CSR activities have been rather neutral. Furthermore, the results show 
minor increase in the cost of equity capital for companies’ that have adopted CSR prac-
tices. This indicates that the market reaction has been even negative for those compa-
nies. Thus, it appears that the markets might see investments in CSR practices rather as 
a cost-increasing factor with no additional value creation than as a risk-decreasing fac-
tor. 
 
Moreover, the companies’ that are involved in controversial business areas seem to en-
joy slightly lower equity financing costs. Thus, it seems that the markets have rather re-
warded companies of operating in controversial business areas. Especially involvement 
in businesses such as alcohol, armaments, and nuclear are seen positive from market 
perspective and companies involved in these business areas benefit from lower financ-
ing costs even during the financial crisis.  
 
To further expand the study, the examination is also conducted during the pre-crisis pe-
riod, the crisis period, and the post-crisis period. This comparison provides information 
about how CSR effects on the cost of equity capital during economic downturn com-
pared to more stable periods. The results remain unchanged during all three sub-periods, 
and companies that have invested in CSR activities do not benefit from it during eco-
nomic downturn or crisis period in the means of lower financing costs. Yet, companies 
that are involved have with controversial business areas benefit fro slightly lower cost 
of equity capital during the crisis period. 
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The individual CSR and controversial business variables are also reviewed during the 
three sub-periods. The results show that diversity and opportunity (CSR_DIV_S) has had 
a negative and statistically significant effect on cost of equity capital during the post-
crisis period (2010-2013). However, during the financial crisis period especially in-
vestments in emission reduction (CSR_EMI_S), resource reduction (CSR_RES_S), and 
employee issues (CSR_EMP_S) have increased companies financing costs through the 
cost of equity capital. The results for individual controversial business areas show that 
during crisis period companies involved in alcohol (CSR_ALC), armaments (CSR_ARM) 
or nuclear (CSR_NUC) industry have benefit from lower cost of equity capital. Thus, it 
seems that during economic downturn companies benefit from involvement in contro-
versial businesses rather than investing in CSR practices. 
 
In conclusion, the findings show that companies that have invested in CSR do not have 
lower financing costs compared to companies with lacking CSR involvement. Thus, 
there is no evidence that CSR activities would improve company’s risk level on the fi-
nancial markets. Hence, the results invalidate the hypotheses that CSR would decrease 
the cost of equity capital, or that the companies with higher CSR commitment would 
have been less risky investments during the financial crisis. Also, the hypotheses con-
cerning the controversial business areas are rejected, and there is even a slight indication 
that the markets would actually prefer companies that are involved in controversial 
business issues. Therefore, the question remains unsolved: why do companies invest on 
CSR if it is not profitable? 
 
It seems that there is an interest conflict between shareholder’s and stockholders. The 
markets have not valued companies’ investments for “doing good”, and the “sin” stock 
companies profit from slightly lower financing costs. However, the CSR issues have 
gained more attention during recent years from the policy makers, media, and stake-
holders.  In addition, we have seen dramatic value losses from companies’ that have 
been noticed to lack in their CSR policies. Yet, the problem with CSR is that it is rather 
easy for companies to report good CSR figures even though there are actual deficiencies 
in the CSR practices and no real value creation appears. Even though it seems that CSR 
does not effect on the firm valuation via the cost of equity capital there might be other 
means companies profit from investing in CSR.  
 
The CSR activities will increase in the future through legislation and demand. There-
fore, it is suggested that the examination of CSR impact on company’s riskiness should 
be investigated further to solve in which ways CSR does effect on company’s valuation 
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and performance. Furthermore, the markets are still changing and CSR is relatively new 
factor in its current extensiveness, which means that the lacks in CSR processes might 
have even more dramatic consequences in the future. Thus, CSR will most likely have 
greater impact on firm valuation in the near future.  
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APPENDIX 1. 
 
Appendix 1. The list of corporate social responsible variables 
 
Corporate governance: 
Gender 
Experience 
Independence 
Size 
Board Functioning Processes 
CEO Board Member 
CEO Compensation Link to Total Shareholder Return 
Compensation Committee 
Compensation Improvement Tools 
Extra-Financial Performance Oriented 
Executive Retention 
Corporate Governance Committee 
External Consultants 
Nomination Committee 
Shareholders Approval of Stock Based Compensation Plan 
Board Functioning Processes 
 
Emission reduction:  
Biodiversity Impact Reduction 
Commercial Risks and/or Opportunities Due to Climate Change 
e-Waste Reduction 
Emissions 
Emissions Trading 
Environmental Investments Initiatives 
Environmental Partnerships 
Environmental Restoration Initiatives 
NOx and SOx Emissions Reduction 
Particulate Matter Emissions Reduction 
Staff Transportation Impact Reduction 
VOC Emissions Reduction 
Waste Reduction Total 
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Environmental Products: 
Animal Testing Reduction Initiative 
Clean Technology 
Eco-Design Products 
Environmental Products 
Environmental Project Financing 
Equator Principles 
Hybrid Technology 
Labeled Wood 
Noise Reduction 
Organic Products Initiatives 
Product Environmental Responsible Use 
Sustainable Building Products 
Take-back and Recycling Initiatives 
Water Technology 
 
Resource reduction:  
Environment Management Team 
Environment Management Training 
Resource Efficiency Processes/Policy Water Efficiency 
Resource Efficiency Processes/Policy Energy Efficiency 
Resource Efficiency Processes/Policy Environmental Supply Chain 
Materials Sourcing Environmental Criteria 
Toxic Substances Reduction Initiatives 
Renewable Energy Use 
Green Buildings 
Environmental Supply Chain Selection Management 
Environmental Supply Chain Partnership Termination 
Land Environmental Impact Reduction 
 
Community:   
Whistleblower Protection 
 Community Reputation Code of Conduct/Policy Fair Competition 
 Community Reputation Code of Conduct/Policy Bribery and Corruption 
 Community Reputation Code of Conduct/Policy Business Ethics 
 Community Reputation Improvement Tools/Business Ethics 
 Whistleblower Protection 
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 Community Reputation Processes/Policy Community Involvement 
 Community Reputation Processes/Fair Competition (inactive) 
 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
 EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
 Employees Community Work 
 Bottom of Pyramid Pricing 
 Crisis Management Systems 
 Corporate Responsibility Awards 
 
Human rights:   
 Human Rights Processes/Policy Freedom of Association 
 Human Rights Processes/Policy Child Labor 
 Human Rights Processes/Policy Forced Labor 
 Human Rights Processes/Policy Human Rights 
 Fundamental Human Rights ILO or UN 
 Human Rights Suppliers 
 Ethical Trading Initiative ETI 
 Human Rights Breaches Suppliers 
 
Employee issues:   
 Management Departures 
 Training and Career Development Processes/Policy Skills Training 
 Training and Career Development Processes/Policy Career Development 
 Internal Promotion 
 Management Training 
 Employees Health & Safety Team 
 Employee Health & Safety Training/Health & Safety Training 
 Employee Health & Safety Processes/Policy Supply Chain Health & Safety 
 
Diversity and opportunity:   
  Diversity and Opportunity Processes/Policy Diversity and Opportunity 
  Flexible Working Schemes 
  Day Care Services 
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APPENDIX 2. 
 
Appendix 2. The list of controversial business areas variables. 
 
Controversial businesses: 
Alcohol 
Alcohol 5% Revenues 
Gambling 
Gambling 5% Revenues 
Tobacco 
Tobacco 5% Revenues 
Armaments 
Armament Revenues 
Nuclear 
Nuclear 5% Revenues 
Nuclear Production 
 
 
 
 
 
